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This thesis sheds light on Cost Contribution Arrangements (CCAs) as a tax planning tool for 
the multinational enterprise. CCA is a framework agreed among enterprises to share costs 
and risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights. Tax planning is 
choices of adaption within the legal framework of tax law with an economic goal of 
maximizing firm value. To reduce the tax burden many multinationals try to shift profits from 
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. This paper analyzes how the cost contribution structure can 
play an important part in achieving this. With a focus on the OECD Guidelines, the thesis 
examines current legislation and illustrate its weaknesses by analyzing a fictitious case. 
Results show that the main tax effects of employing the cost contribution structure in place 
of licensing stems from elimination of withholding taxes and from market prices being 
replaced by costs. The analysis further illustrates that the CCA structure is prone to 
manipulation as the allocation of costs to a large degree depends on assumptions, choices 
and subjective judgment. The OECD regulation requires consistency between contributions 
and expected benefits, however the valuation of these may pose difficulties. Contributions 
of preexisting intangible property and contributions in-kind are particularly problematic to 
value. Moreover, valuation of expected benefits depends on uncertain estimates: e.g. the 
economic life of the developed asset, the timing and the amount of the benefits. New 
participants entering and existing the arrangements presents additional challenges. The 
thesis shows that the cost contribution arrangement can be an efficient tax planning tool as 
it is based on estimates which easily can be over- and underestimated. I conclude that there 
is a need for improving the legislative framework and scrutinize the structure. As each case 
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1.1 Background and motivation 
In recent years, there has been increased media coverage of tax planning as it has been 
known that giant firms such as Starbucks, Google and Amazon in effect barely pay any taxes 
(Barford, 2013). It does not seem fair that some multinationals pay as little as 3-5% in 
taxation on corporate profits, while smaller businesses have an effective tax rate which can 
be up to ten times this rate.  
 
Tax planning has gained an important position in cost accounting and management control. 
Over the last two decades, the organization of the multinational company has changed 
dramatically. With the development of global value chains, intra-firm trade has increased in 
importance (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). It is estimated that two out of three of all business 
transactions take place between related parties (European Commision, 2011). Transfer 
pricing is an important part of tax planning and considered one of the most common 
techniques for shifting profits between jurisdictions. OECD considers it to be a severe 
problem as it undermines domestic tax systems and encourages tax competition among 
countries (OECD, 2013a).  
 
One transfer pricing technique less focused upon is the cost contribution structure. Since it 
first was introduced, the concept of Cost Contribution Arrangements (CCAs) has been 
considered controversial. In a CCA, participants pay their share of the costs for access to the 
service or asset developed. In comparison to other transfer pricing techniques, market prices 
are replaced by costs. The assignment of costs depends on contributions and expected 
benefits, and the valuation of these relies on assumptions and subjective judgment. 
Consequently they are prone to manipulation. Regardless of the criticism it has received, the 
CCA structure is increasingly being employed and can play an important role in a MNEs tax 
planning strategy. According to one of the big four accounting firms, Ernst and Young, CCAs 
can provide solutions to difficult and complicated transfer pricing issues, particularly in 




These days, there is being done a lot of work on tax planning and the topic is highly relevant. 
The fact that MNEs spend vast amounts on acquiring tax advice from external experts, 
implies that the potential cost savings from restructuring trade must be great. The tax 
systems clearly have weaknesses when the potential cost savings can justify hiring expensive 
consultants. My fascination with tax planning made me search for a topic related to this. I 
chose the concept of Cost Contribution Arrangements, in particular, as I saw a need to shed 
some light upon the subject. Although the structure already play an important role in 
international tax planning, it has been given little attention.  
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this paper is to place focus on Cost Contribution Arrangements and their role 
in tax planning. The aim is to illustrate how an inadequate legislative framework can 
facilitate employment of CCA as a tax planning tool. The first question to be addressed is 
therefore: Which features of the CCA structure and present regulation enable it to act as tax 
planning tool? And secondly; where should the tax authorities place their focus to reduce 
the problem? 
 
I argue that there is an urgent need for improving the CCA framework and that it up to this 
point has not been sufficiently scrutinized. I will focus on the problem through explaining 
current legislation and further employ a fictive case. This paper is not written with an aim to 
advice firms how to exploit the system, but rather to point out how existing legislation 
indirectly encourage tax planning and favor MNEs over domestic firms. Furthermore I hope 
to illustrate how tax planning has turned into an important managerial matter, no longer 
only a legal one. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is a case study, structured around a hypothetical case that I have created for the 
purpose of this thesis. I have chosen to explore three jurisdictions I find to be particularly 
interesting: the US, Spain and Norway. In terms of CCA experience these jurisdictions differ 
greatly. In the US, CCAs are commonly employed and have been a focus for a long time. 
Spain has some experience, whereas Norway has very little (Ernst & Young, 2003). When 
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discussing tax planning, Ireland, Switzerland and the Netherlands are typical jurisdictions 
chosen to illustrate the issues. I was curious to look into the tax legislation of some 
jurisdictions less focused upon, consequently Spain and Norway were selected. The US was 
chosen due its great experience and extensive regulation of CCAs.  
 
The case has been created as to show the effect of employing the CCA instead of alternative 
structures. CCA is mainly compared with licensing. Direct sales will also be mentioned as an 
alternative, but as this is different in nature and less prone to valuation issues, it is less 
interesting to compare. Structuring related-party trade through direct sales implies that 
intangible property is replaced by physical goods and manipulating transfer prices is more 
challenging. Moreover, related-party trade through direct sales is likely to imply a different 
cost structure as production is centralized in the country of R&D. This can further complicate 
the process of comparison. 
 
The thesis will put a lot of emphasis on the process of developing the CCA, and less on the 
final results. The reason for focusing on process rather than outcome is that the final results 
may vary greatly depending on the case. In terms of CCAs there is not one final answer to be 
found. There final outcome depends on assumptions about the future, estimates chosen, 
valuation techniques and various decisions made in the process.  
 
The first part of the thesis is the theory. Here I will explain concepts and legal frameworks. 
As both Spain and Norway rely on the OECD guidelines for transfer pricing, this framework 
will be explained in detail. The US on the other hand, treats CCAs by reference to domestic 
legislation. Thus, a greater emphasis will be put on explaining the OECD guidelines and the 
legislation of the US, than the domestic regulation of Spain and Norway. The second part 
consists of a presentation of the case, followed by a discussion and suggested solutions. In 
the last part of the thesis, the results are analyzed and the research questions are further 
addressed. Although this paper is interdisciplinary, combining law and management control, 
the central theory is current legislation. The main literature is therefore the OECD’s 
regulation of Cost Contribution Arrangements, set forth in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines chapter VII. Furthermore the OECD Model Tax Convention, Spanish, Norwegian 
and US domestic law have been employed.  
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2 Theory  
2.1 Tax planning 
2.1.1 The concept  
Tax planning is a versatile term that is being employed in different settings, both in judicial 
and economic literature, as well as in the media. Tax planning can be executed both on the 
individual level and the firm level, international or national. Generally however, tax planning 
is carried out in MNEs as corporations operating in different tax jurisdiction have the 
greatest opportunities to reduce their tax base. Divergent tax systems can be exploited to 
reduce overall tax burden.   
 
For tax administrators, international tax planning is considered to constitute a risk to tax 
revenues, tax sovereignty and tax justice. Countries are losing tax revenue they are entitled 
to and have to use more resources to ensure compliance. Domestic companies are harmed 
as the competition with MNEs get tougher. And furthermore, when MNEs reduce their tax 
bills, other tax payers may have to take a greater share of the burden (OECD, 2013a).  
 
International tax planning is not a new concept. However, liberalization of financial markets 
and increased globalization has increased its attractiveness. Barriers for transferring assets 
have been reduced, while knowledge about tax planning strategies and the potential savings 
have become more widespread (OECD, 2013a). As the advantages of tax planning are 
growing, greater prevalence was to be expected.  
2.1.2 Characteristics of tax planning 
Though an umbrella term covering a vast set of strategies, a general feature of tax planning 
is adaption to differing tax policies across states with an aim of maximizing overall wealth 
(OECD, 2013b). An important feature is that the techniques employed are legal and not in 
conflict with the legislators’ intentions. The firm adapts to the differing policies, it does not 
bend them. This adaption is a process that involves making decisions concerning the timing 
and method by which transactions are completed, income reported and deductions and 
credits are claimed (Commerce Clearing House, 1988). The tax planning strategies affect the 
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tax expenditure through the tax base, the tax rate and the timing of the tax payments. These 
factors affect the tax liability through the accrual accounting principles of the tax legislation. 
 
The economic objective of tax planning is to maximize firm value, not solely minimize tax 
liability (Fallan, 2011). This specification is important as these objectives not necessarily are 
consistent. For instance, a firm ceasing to exist will not be liable to taxes. Dissolution of the 
firm will minimize taxes, but not maximize firm value. Furthermore, reducing taxes usually 
come at a cost. Shifting profits entail transaction costs. It is likely that tax experts must be 
hired and internal tax team must be paid for the extra work. If tax minimization is the 
ultimate goal, the firm would hire the best tax experts regardless of the price charged. This 
would make no sense. Tax minimization in itself cannot be the economic objective. Only if 
there were no costs of shifting profits, tax minimization and maximization of firm value 
would be consistent at all times.  
 
This paper will be based on the understanding that strategic tax planning is choices of 
adaption within the legal framework of tax law with an economic goal of maximizing firm 
value. It is further assumed that the MNEs consider tax minimization to be consistent with 
maximizing the firm value. 
2.1.3 Key principles for taxation of cross-border activities 
There are various sets of rules that regulates the taxation of cross-border activities: internal 
tax law, double tax treaties and other international law instruments, such as those 
applicable in the European Union (Regulations, Directives, etc.). The connection to a 
jurisdiction is an important element in determining the right to tax. This is exercised on an 
entity-to-entity basis, not on the group as a whole (OECD, 2013a). Consequently, if a 
multinational has entities in different countries, the entities will be tax liable to the 
jurisdiction with which they are connected, separately from the connection of the group as a 
whole.  
 
Tax systems can be divided into worldwide and territorial systems. The worldwide system 
taxes its residents on their worldwide income. This is resident taxation. Worldwide income 
include all income also that generated from foreign controlled subsidiaries. The territorial 
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system on the other hand would tax all income generated within the jurisdiction (OECD, 
2013a). This implies that all income generated within a country will be taxed regardless of 
the owners’ residency. This is source taxation.  
 
Interaction of domestic tax systems can lead to an overlap. An item of income can for 
identical periods be taxed by more than one jurisdiction, thus resulting in double taxation. 
Double taxation is the classical problem in international taxation. It is seen as unfortunate 
due to lack of economic justice and efficiency. Furthermore, it hinders development of 
international trade and economic relations in general (OECD, 2010b). To avoid companies 
being taxed by two jurisdictions, most countries have signed tax treaties. These agreements 
regulate who’s entitled to tax if an entity is subject to double taxation. The OECD model 
treaty is widely employed, and so the underlying principles of the treaties are quite uniform. 
The newest version of the treaty is the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
2010. The framework itself is not binding law, however as most countries have incorporated 
it into domestic law, in effect it is (Bjerke, 1997). Nonetheless, transactions can also leave 
gaps, resulting in income not being taxed anywhere and so-called double non-taxation 
(OECD, 2013a). This is where tax planning come into play. By considering differences in tax 
systems and employing tax planning strategies, a firm may achieve a situation of double non-
taxation. Traditionally, less emphasis has been put on filling these gaps.  
The OECD 
The tax authority in the OECD is the Council of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. OECD’s framework for transfer pricing was first approved in 1995 as to 
provide guidance for the development of internal tax law (Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004). 
Since this, the original version of OECDs Transfer Pricing Guidelines has been supplemented 
with chapters regulating the pricing of intangibles, services, cost contribution arrangements 
and guidelines for conducting advance pricing arrangements. OECD member states are 
encouraged to follow these guidelines in their examination practices and to undertake their 
analysis of transfer pricing from that perspective (OECD, 2010b). The guidelines carry 
considerable weight and is of great importance and influence in most jurisdictions today 




The OECD Model Tax Convention art.9 regulates trade between associated enterprises. It 
also introduces the concept of arm’s length pricing. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinationals further provide guidance on the application of the article. They guidelines 
describe how to apply the Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) for valuation, for tax purposes, of 
cross-border transactions between associated enterprises. 
The US 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the tax authority in the US. Residents are taxed on 
worldwide income, with a credit or deduction for taxes paid on foreign income (Leibowicz, 
2013). In the US, worldwide income includes most gross income, also passive income such as 
dividends, interests, royalties etc.). Resident taxation hinders reduction of tax burden 
through outbound transactions. Inbound transactions, i.e. transactions of foreign companies 
operating in the US, are taxed based on the source principle. Any firm generating income in 
the US is therefore liable to taxation. However, the regulations set forth by the IRS can be 
set aside in the case of a tax treaty. These always take priority over the IRS. (Leibowicz, 2013) 
 
For corporations with taxable income above US$ 18,333,333 a flat rate of 35% applies. For 
those earning less, there is a graduated rate starting as low as 15%. Royalties received by a 
foreign corporation for the use of property in the US are subject to a 30% withholding tax, 
unless rate is reduced through a tax treaty (Deloitte, 2013a). 
Norway 
The Norwegian tax authorities are named the Norwegian Revenue Authorities. Most of the 
85 treaties that Norway has entered into have few deviations from the OECD Model Treaty 
(Brudvik, 2013). Although the model treaties play a central role in Norwegian tax legislation, 
domestic law is still what determines the jurisdiction to tax. The Norwegian Tax Act §§ 2-1 to 
2-5 regulates who are tax liable to the Norwegian Tax Authorities. The general rule is that all 
residents, whether physical or legal, are taxed on their worldwide income. A resident is a 
company incorporated in Norway or a foreign company with effective management and 




Taxable income includes ordinary business income, interests, royalties and gains on foreign 
currency. Furthermore, non-residents may also be tax liable to the extent income is 
generated in Norway or related to Norway in another manner (Brudvik, 2013). This implies 
that resident companies are subject to corporation tax on worldwide income and capital 
gains, while non-resident companies will be taxed on Norwegian sourced profits, including 
income derived from a permanent establishment in Norway. Tax treaties can only ease the 
tax liability authorized by Norwegian law, never tighten it (Brudvik, 2013).  
 
In Norway the corporate tax rate is a flat rate of 27% (Finansdepartementet, 2014). The tax 
is imposed on company profits which can consist of business income, passive income and 
capital gains. There is no withholding tax imposed on royalties (Deloitte, 2013b).  
Spain 
The tax authorities in Spain is Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria and jurisdiction 
to tax is determined by the Spanish corporate income tax law. Residents are subject to 
corporate tax on worldwide income. Taxable income includes all business profits and capital 
gains, less deductible expenses. Non-residents are taxable on source income and gains. 
However, as Spain has concluded over 70 tax treaties, many tax issues are regulated by 
these instead of the domestic regulation. 
 
As in Norway, a company is deemed to be resident in Spain for tax purposes if it was 
incorporated under Spanish law, that its registered office is located in Spain or that its 
effective management headquarters are in Spain (Deloitte, 2012b). The general corporate 
tax rate in Spain is 30%, but there is a reduced rate for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
There is also special regulation for the Canary Islands. Spain has imposed withholding tax on 
royalties. In 2013 the rate was 24.75% (Deloitte, 2012).  
2.1.4 Transfer pricing and base erosion   
When discussion tax planning, transfer pricing and profit shifting are natural components. 
Transfer pricing is the act of pricing transactions or transfers between two associated 
entities. The OECD Model Tax Convention states that two enterprises are associated if “an 
enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
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control or capital of an enterprise of the other contracting state”, or “the same persons 
participate directly or indirectly in management, control or capital of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State”1. This implies that two 
parties are associated when a person or an enterprise in one state holds an indirect or direct 
interest in an enterprise located in another. 
 
When independent enterprises transact, the conditions of the transactions are generally 
determined by market forces. Contrarily, for associated parties and controlled transactions 
there may be many factors influencing the price. Although the entities may be considered as 
separate entities for tax purposes, they still belong to the same economic entity with an 
ultimate goal of maximizing joint profits. Transfer prices do affect how profits are allocated 
among affiliates, and thereby their tax base. The MNEs overall tax burden is reduced when 
profits are shifted from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. Profits are increased when costs are 
reduced. As taxes commonly are considered costs of doing business, minimizing these is 
often a goal.  
 
In order to reduce profit shifting and base erosion, companies are limited from setting 
transfer prices freely. The OECD guidelines and the Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) are in effect 
law in many countries. The ALP is the international standard that the OECD member 
countries have agreed should be used for determining transfer prices. The OECD Model Tax 
Convention article 9 defines the Arm’s length principle as follows: “where conditions are 
made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, 
by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that 
enterprise and taxed accordingly”. Transactions between related parties, so-called 
controlled transactions, must be priced as if the entities were not associated. However, as 
we will come back to, enforcing compliance with the ALP is challenging. 
 
                                                          
1 OECD Model Tax Convention art.9 subparagraphs 1a and 1b 
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Both in the regulation of the US and the OECD guidance is not exhaustive and choice is still 
an important part of transfer pricing. As there is a vast number of varieties of intra-trade 
structures, creating an exhaustive legislation is very difficult.   
2.2 Cost Contribution Arrangements 
2.2.1 The concept 
 
(EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, 2012) 
Article 8.3 of the OECDs guidelines for transfer pricing defines Cost Contribution 
Arrangements (CCAs) as a framework agreed among enterprises to share costs and risks of 
developing, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights. The CCA should also determine 
the nature and extent of the interests of each participant in those assets, services and rights 
(OECD, 2010a). In the US, the equivalent to the CCA is the Cost Sharing Agreement (CSA). 
The CSA has many of the same characteristics. The IRS defines the CSA as “an agreement 
under which the parties agree to share the costs of development of one or more intangibles 
in proportion to their shares of reasonably anticipated benefits from their individual 
exploitation of the interests in the intangibles assigned to them under the arrangement”2.  
(United States Treasury Regulations, 1996). 
 
Although the definitions seem very similar at a first glance, there are some differences 
between the two. The main difference is that the CCA is defined as a framework, whilst the 
CSA is an agreement as such. Moreover, CCAs cover the costs and risks of developing, 
                                                          
2 The US Internal Revenues Code section 482-7(a)(1) 
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producing or obtaining assets, services or rights while the CSA is only concerned with the 
research or development of intangibles.  Thus the definition of the CSA is narrower than that 
of the CCA. For the purpose of this paper, they will in the continuation be treated as equals. 
The historic development of CCAs and its alternatives 
During the last decades, an increasing number of entities have moved operations out of their 
country of incorporation. The number of MNEs is growing, and so is their global presence as 
they are investing in more countries than ever before. Initially, foreign direct investment 
entailed duplication of activities, such as establishing a distribution center or a sales office 
simply to gain access to new markets and circumvent trade barriers. Headquarter activities 
were still concentrated in the MNEs home country (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). 
In the 1990s, MNEs began to fragmentize the production process. They realized that by 
specializing vertically, quality could be improved and costs could be reduced. Vertical 
integration and offshoring production became common. Trade costs and production factors 
determined where facilities where located. It became common to buy services from 
associated affiliates instead of external parties. In early transfer pricing regimes, there was 
great freedom as to how transfer prices were set. Each country had their own regulation and 
sometimes they conflicted. With greater volumes and more complex transactions, the 
international community recognized a need for change. In the late 20th Century the US 
treasury performed substantial work on the matter and revised its corporate income tax 
regulation over the 1986-94 period, and in 1995 the OECD issued its first major update since 
1979 (Eden, 2001). 
The ALP was implemented, but unfortunately it did not eliminate the problem, only reduced 
it. MNEs found ways to circumvent the ALP. The royalty structure soon became common due 
to its function as a tax planning tool. Royalties are payments for exploiting intangible rights 
such as patents, copyrights and knowhow (Jousma, n.d.). In 1999 US parent companies 
received royalties of US$ 23.3bn (Kleinert, 2004). 
As MNEs transfer an increasing amount of knowledge and technology abroad, structuring 
this trade efficiently has become even more important (Kleinert, 2004). Taxes are seen as a 
great cost for MNEs, thus tax planning has grown popular. To prevent MNEs implanting the 
licensing structure solely for tax planning purposes, many jurisdictions have imposed 
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withholding tax on royalties. Thus, royalty payments are taxed in the source country and also 
as income in the hands of the recipient. For the MNEs, the CCA structure is seen to solve this 
issue as few jurisdictions view contributions as taxable income (Holmes & Holmes, 2005). As 
participants only transfer costs between them and terminate the arrangement before 
income generation starts, assets can be transferred without being subject to taxation. 
Current CCA regulation is flexible and the arrangements are increasing in popularity (Ernst & 
Young, 2003). 
2.2.2 Characteristics of the CCA 
CCAs are most commonly practiced in industries with high R&D costs. Typical industries are 
those of software, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, chemicals, oil and gas (Ernst & Young, 
2003). For an arrangement to qualify as a CCA in accordance with the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines chapter 8, it must have the five following characteristics (Peters, Preshaw, & 
Luquet, 2004): 
1. Cover a certain activity: developing, producing or obtaining assets, services or rights 
2. A contractual agreement between various participants 
3. Not be regarded as a distinct judicial entity or a permanent establishment 
4. Result in a mutual benefit, where each participant’s proportionate share of the total 
contribution is consistent with the proportionate share of the expected benefits to be 
received from the CCA 
5. Each participant must be entitled to exploit its interest in the CCA activity separately as an 
effective owner thereof. 
 
First, the arrangement must involve an activity that will be performed by various 
participants. The activity can be research, development, common marketing, provision of a 
service etc. Participants do not necessarily have to be related parties, but in practice they 
usually are. Independent enterprises prefer other structures than to share and pool 
resources (HM Revenue and Customs, 2013). Secondly, the term “mutual benefit” require 
that each party receive a benefit from participation in the arrangement. The participant’s 
proportion of the total expected benefit must be consistent with the proportion of the total 
contribution. Expected benefits comprise both the development and the result of the 
activity. This criterion is in effect a deterrent for potential misuse of the CCA rule. The 
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criterion hinders participants from using CCA as a mechanism for transferring profits from 
one participant, the “contributor”, to another, the “benefit receiver”. An allocation method 
reflecting the relation between benefits and costs incurred should be employed (Valuation 
Research Corporation, 2008). Thirdly, each party must have a defined interest in the project. 
Having an interest implies that each party is entitled to exploit its interest in the CCA activity 
separately as an effective owner and not as a licensee, and so without paying a royalty or 
other consideration to any party for that interest. Each participant becomes an owner of an 
interest in the results, and so participants has to be compensated by the other participants 
exploiting this interest (Barbenec, 2010). 
 
Another distinctive characteristic of the CCA is that it would not be regarded as a separate 
juridical entity in its own right nor as a permanent establishment of all the participants 
(Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004). The OECD defines a permanent establishment as a fixed 
place of business3. Per se, the CCA is simply an arrangement where the participants 
contribute and receive a benefit consistent with their contribution. The arrangement is not a 
separate entity liable to taxation. To illustrate how the CCA differs from the more common 
licensing structure, we can compare the two in a table, see attachment 1.  
The purpose of CCA 
Documenting economic substance is important when structuring a CCA. The business’ 
decision to form a CCA can be justified by various motives, e.g. economies of scale or sharing 
of risks, skills and resources (EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, 2012). First, CCAs usually 
require less administrative work than complicated web of intra-firm transactions such 
royalties and service fees. Second, when more parties are involved the potential loss of a 
commercial failure is reduced. This may enable larger investments and more risk taking. 
Moreover, it might be that certain knowledge is required and acquiring this is costly. Sharing 
experience and expertise will result in a greater base of knowledge than if all were operating 
independently. In addition, pooling resources can be a more cost efficient approach to 
acquiring new assets and may allow smaller entities access to costly equipment.  
 
                                                          
3 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2010 art.5 
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For the entities involved, the CCAs can also be beneficial from a taxation point of view. CCAs 
are particularly beneficial when global development activities would otherwise require 
global cross-licensing arrangements which can result in a greater tax burden. Royalties may 
result in additional taxes in the form of withholding taxes as well as additional scrutiny from 
tax authorities (Valuation Research Corporation, 2008).  
 
Compared to licensing, in CCAs market prices get replaced by incurred costs. As a 
consequence, the CCA can be particularly profitable when development takes place in the 
high-tax jurisdiction. In such a case more profits will remain in the low-taxed country and the 
group’s overall tax burden will be reduced. Through CCAs enterprises can also mitigate 
intangibles off-shore by having new participants buy in to the existing intangible property 
and gain the rights to a portion of the income attributable to the intangible property 
(Valuation Research Corporation, 2008). 
2.2.3 Different types of CCAs 
There are two major groups of CCAs. The most common is a CCA created to research and 
develop intangible property to the benefit of more participants. The second type is a CCA 
made to fund or obtain a certain service. Alternatively one can think of a third type; a hybrid 
of the two groups. 
 
(1) CCA to perform research and development or produce or acquire assets or rights (R&D CCA):  
The purpose of an R&D CCA is mainly to research and produce or acquire intangible 
property. An example could be several participants uniting to develop a new software. 
Another could be participants pooling their resources to buy a patented technology from an 
external party. The commercial rationale for such an agreement is to share risk of financial 
loss. As a commercial failure would be more manageable if split on several participants, risk 
sharing may enable participants to take more chances than they would independently. For 
smaller entities, participation in a CCA may be the only approach to acquire an intangible 
asset. As it only has to contribute with a portion of the R&D costs, a CCA provides it with 
greater solidity. Other reasons for participating might be administrative barriers or lack of 
required knowledge or skills. The results of a CCA activity is unknown, hence the amount of 




The outcome of a successful CCA activity is an interest in the developed asset, which must be 
exploited to the participant’s own benefit, and not the benefit of the others. The interest 
may be a right to produce or market an asset in a specific geographic area or for specific 
applications. The legal ownership can be joint or one participant may be the legal owner of 
the property. However, economically all the participants are co-owners. (Barbenec, 2010; 
Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004; OECD, 2010a) 
 
(2) CCA to share services (Pure Services CCA): 
The participants pool their resources to obtain a certain service which they can use 
separately. They can for example develop a shared service center that enables them to 
acquire services of identical quality as if purchased externally. The rationale behind the Pure 
Services CCA is to share costs, and thereby ensure efficiency and avoid duplicity of 
operations. As a consequence the result of the agreements is not a tangible or an intangible 
asset or right. The centers are typically shared managerial, technical or administrative 
service centers. The benefits are immediate or short term, being ordinarily realized the 
period in which the service activities are performed. The risk of commercial failure is not 
severe. (Barbenec, 2010; Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004) 
 
(3) The combination of the two types of CCAs (Hybrid CCA): 
The third group is a combination of the two. The purpose of the Hybrid CCA is not only to 
develop or acquire the asset, but also join marketing, centralize purchasing and managerial 
service or share technical support (Barbenec, 2010). As an example: when several 
participants join forces to develop new software and in addition establish a common 
customer support center, they would be creating a hybrid CCA. 
 
Note that some CCAs do not fit into any of these three categories. An example is CCAs 
formed to facilitate joint acquisition of tangible property, a structure which is allowed in 
most OECD jurisdictions. CCAs mays also be developed with a purpose of reducing tax 
liability (Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004). 
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2.2.4 Regulation of Cost Contribution Arrangements  
The OECD 
The OECD has developed guidelines for Cost Contribution Agreements. These are not binding 
law, but as the OECD Guidelines generally are considered to provide the best international 
practice concerning taxation of CCAs, they do in effect regulate most. Countries have taken 
different approaches in adopting the OECD Guidelines. Some have essentially implemented 
the framework as a whole, whereas others have chosen not to implement any part. Out of 
those that have implemented the guidelines, one can further divide into two groups: Those 
that have implemented the OECD Guidelines into their domestic law and those in which the 
tax authorities follow the guidelines despite not being legally obliged to do so. The OECD 
regulation does not determine the deductibility of contributions. This is determined by 
domestic law in the respective country. Usually this is based on the nature of the cost 
contribution activity (Deloitte, 2012). 
The US 
CCAs are common features of multinationals doing business in the US. A lot of emphasis has 
been put on developing extensive regulation and the tax authorities have plenty experience 
with transfer pricing and CCAs. Therefore it is often referred to the US regulation if the OECD 
guidelines and domestic law are insufficient. The arrangements are most common for 
sharing intangible development costs in relation to technology, business process intangibles, 
brand intangibles and customer based intangibles. They are also very common in the 
pharmaceutical industry. (Ernst & Young, 2003)  
 
The US has specific regulation for treatment of CCAs set forth in domestic law. These are 
found in the Code of Federal Regulations. The main concepts of the OECD Guidelines are 
implemented. There are two key differences to be found: (1) the OECDs definition of the 
CCA is more flexible than that of CSA in the US regulation and (2) the US permit increased 
hindsight when tax authorities challenges the allocation of costs to a taxpayer (Holmes & 
Holmes, 2005). In general the US regulation is more far-reaching than that of the OECD. 
However, in most domestic regulation and practical administration of CCA, the US would 
respect the OECD guidelines (Ernst & Young, 2003). The Code of Federal Regulations defines 
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a set of methods that can be used for valuating contributions. As mentioned, the US 
differentiate between CCA for services and CCA for intangible property. Different methods 
are recommended for different types of arrangements. The regulation does, however, 
require that the best and most reliable method is employed4.  
 
For the contributor, the contributions are generally tax deductible. They can be in the form 
of royalties, instalments or a lump-sum payment. To deter MNEs from manipulating 
expected benefits and contributions, the arrangements are subject to detailed audits in the 
US. CCA payments in each year must be examined and adjusted if necessary to ensure that 
they are in proportion to the participants reasonably anticipated benefits from the 
intangibles used. Given the administrative burdens associated with a CCA in the US, the 
accounting firm Ernst & Young recommends considering alternative structures such as joint 
ventures and cross licensing agreements (Ernst & Young, 2003). An advantage of the CCA 
structure is that for the recipient the contribution is not taxable income (Holmes & Holmes, 
2005). 
Norway 
CCAs are not widespread in Norway. They are most often found in industries relating to oil & 
gas and development of software or technology (Ernst & Young, 2003). The low number of 
CCAs is reflected in the Norwegian tax law; there is no particular regulation of CCA in 
domestic law. The tax authorities rely on the General Tax Act and has not implemented the 
OECD Guidelines in domestic law. Nevertheless, in practice the tax administrators generally 
follow the guidelines (Zimmer, 2009). The CCAs can cover R&D, intellectual property (other 
than technology), shared services and stock options. Contributions would normally be 
deductible for tax purposes, but can be challenged on the basis of proportionality and 
domestic tax regulations. The General Tax Act § 6-1 states that a group rightfully can 
subtract costs spent to acquire, maintain or secure taxable income. This implies that the 
entity can subtract its proportion of the costs to the degree it is expected to benefit from the 
CCA (Zimmer, 2009). Costs can only be deducted if they are seen to be an investment in 
expected future benefits.  
                                                          




The Arm’s Length Principle is incorporated in Norwegian Law. According to § 13-1 in the 
General Tax Act the contract regulating trade between two or more associated tax subjects 
should be developed as if they were independent of another. For § 13-1 to apply, there has 
to be a common interest, one of the parties must have faced a reduction in income or 
wealth and the reduction must be due to the common interest. A definition of related 
parties cannot be found in the tax law. In relation to the duty to specify and document 
controlled transactions however, associated entities are defined in § 4-12(4), of the Tax 
Assessment Act. According to this paragraph the following entities shall be deemed to be 
associated:  
a. Any company or entity that, directly or indirectly, is at least 50 percent owned or 
controlled by the entity obliged to specify or document;  
b. Any individual, company or entity that, directly or indirectly, has at least 50 percent 
ownership of, or control over, the entity obliged to specify or document;  
c. Any company or entity that, directly or indirectly, is at least 50 percent owned or 
controlled by any entity that is deemed to be an associated party pursuant to Item b;  and  
d. Any parent, sibling, child, grandchild, spouse, cohabitant, parent of a spouse and parent of 
a cohabitant of any individual who is deemed to be an associated party pursuant to Item b, 
as well as any company or entity that, directly or indirectly, is at least 50 percent owned or 
controlled by such individuals. 
 
The Norwegian Tax Act does not provide further guidance about how the AL price should be 
calculated, nor how to treat cost contribution arrangements in particular. For this, § 13-4 
refer to the OECD guidelines.  
Spain 
CCAs are common amongst MNEs doing business in Spain. They are most often seen in 
relation to cost sharing in the automotive, computer hardware and software, chemical and 
machinery industries. In Spain the CCAs are limited to costs related to intangibles. This 




Spain has implemented the OECD Guidelines in their domestic law. Article 16 of the Spanish 
Corporate Income Tax law provides the regulatory framework for CCAs. Associated parties is 
defined in § 16-3. It is deemed to be associated: 
a. An entity and the owners of its equity (at least the 5% or 1% when the shares are carried 
out on official secondary securities regulated markets), or the spouse, ascendants or 
descendants 
b. An entity and the member of its board of directors or their administrators (includes the 
fact administrators) or the spouse, ascendants or descendants 
c. Two entities of the same group 
d. An entity and the partners (or the spouse, ascendants or descendants) of an entity of the 
same group 
e. An entity and the members of the board of directors of an entity of the same group or 
their administrators 
f. Two entities where the second entity owns, indirectly, at least, 25% of the capital of the 
first one 
g. Two entities when the same person (or the spouse, ascendants or descendants) or entity 
own, directly or indirectly, 25% of the equity 
h. An entity resident in Spain and their permanent establishment situated in other country. 
i. An entity resident in other country and their PE situated in Spain 
j. Two entities of the same group liable to tax under the cooperative group’s regime 
 
An agreement should be signed prior to entering a CCA and should specify the “nature of the 
services”, the “methods of distribution”, and the “right to use the results”. The tax 
authorities generally follow the OECD guidelines. Contributions are often treated as 
deductible tax expenses for the contributor to the extent they qualify as revenue expense. 
Contributions must be in line with the ALP. Excess deductions could trigger an enquiry by 
Spanish tax authorities. Proportionality of cost and benefit principles and demonstration of 
value for money are keys for deductibility (Ernst & Young, 2003). As in most countries that 
follows the OECD guidelines, contributions are not taxable income for the recipient (Holmes 
& Holmes, 2005). When reviewing distribution criteria the Spanish tax authorities generally 
focus on the rationality and continuity of the arrangement. Tax authorities are unlikely to 
attempt to “unbundle” and value the CCA so long as the CCA is accompanied with the 
23 
 
transfer pricing analysis performed by an independent agent or advisor. Although the CCAs 
are common, the focus of tax authorities has been low to medium (Ernst & Young, 2003). 
2.2.5 Structure of the CCA 
The structure of a CCA will depend on the type of activity, choices made by the participants 
involved and the jurisdictions in which they are located. The OECD Guidelines, as in practice 
is employed by most, do however impose certain conditions that the structure must meet.  
The Arm’s Length Principle  
The OECD guidelines art. 8.13 instruct the members of the CCA to demonstrate consistency 
with the Arm’s Length Principle. Applying the ALP on a CCA implies that the terms of the 
arrangement must be consistent with what unrelated parties would agree upon under 
comparable circumstances given the reasonably expected benefit. Evaluating consistency 
with the ALP can, however, be troublesome.  Finding comparable circumstances might be 
impossible as associated enterprises may enter into arrangements that non-associated 
affiliates would not. Hence, it is not useful undertaking a traditional comparability analysis 
for transfer pricing. 
 
In relation to CCAs it is more helpful to require that the proportions of contributions and 
expected benefits correspond. An agreement between rational unrelated parties would be 
structured in such a manner. No independent entity would enter into an arrangement if they 
were to receive a smaller proportion of the benefits than what they were contributing. For 
each CCA it is therefore necessary to calculate expected benefits in order to find the 
appropriate contributions. Unfortunately, predicting the expected benefits correctly may be 
a complicated process. First a measure for benefits must be decided upon. This can be 
challenging as the expected benefit also can be sharing of risk, synergies of pooling 
knowledge, and cost saving through economies of scale. (OECD, 2010a). Second, the 
expected values of the measure must be estimated. This is particularly a problem in relation 
to R&D activities where the outcome might just as well be a failure as a success.  
 
As it is expected that a firm’s ultimate goal is to maximize profits, the ALP requires that the 
arrangement must be structured so that: (1) Each participant’s proportionate share of the 
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overall contribution is proportional to the overall expected benefits to be received under the 
arrangement, and (2) each participant will have the possibility to exploit the asset as if 
owner, i.e. without paying any royalty or other consideration to any party for that interest.  
 
The process of controlling consistency with the ALP can be broken into three steps: 
1. Define the participants 
2. Measure each participant’s contribution  
3. Determine whether allocation is appropriate 
Identifying the participants 
Identifying the participants may not be as straight forward as it seem. The OECD Guidelines 
art. 8.10-8.12 statuses that all participants must have a reasonable expectation that they will 
benefit from the arrangement. Benefitting solely from performing the activity is inadequate. 
Each party must benefit from the results. Thus if a party do not have a reasonable 
expectation of being able to exploit or use the interest it has been assigned, it cannot be 
considered a participant of the CCA.  
 
Requiring an expected benefit does not require that the activity in fact will be successful. For 
example, research and development may fail to produce commercially valuable intangible 
property. However if the activity continues to fail to produce any actual benefit, the tax 
authorities may question whether independent parties should continue their participation. 
(OECD, 2010a) 
Measuring contribution  
The participants must measure the value or extent of their contributions. All contributions 
must be taken into account, including property of services that are used partly in CCA 
activity and also partly in the participant’s own business activities and also contributions 
made in kind. In terms of valuations, there are several techniques that may be employed. 
Which method that best reflects the AL price, depends on the type of CCA, the situation and 
the conditions of the agreements. In art. 8.15, the OECD states that different countries have 
different experiences and regulations as to how contributions are measured. Art. 8.16 
further argues that valuation should be based on recognized accounting principles and the 
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actual facts. Consistency in method employed is important to ensure that the real values of 
the participants’ contributions can be compared. If one participant’s contribution is 
measured using market value, market value has to be employed for determining all 
contributions. For a service CCA, the contributions are usually valued at cost because it is 
expected that there are small differences between pricing at cost and market value.  
 
The flexibility of the legislation may also be troublesome. As countries measure 
contributions differently, the risk of double taxation rises. Some countries even require 
employment of different techniques when valuing different types of contributions: One 
country may require that contributions of services is measured according to accounting 
costs, while contributions of tangible property is required to value the contribution 
according to market value (Peters, Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004).  
 
US regulation deviate from the OECD with regards to how contribution is valued. In the US 
contribution is essentially defined as accounting costs. Usually this implies R&D costs (Peters, 
Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004). The valuation must therefore follow regular accounting 
principles. This implies that some contributions such as those made in-kind are not 
considered contributions if they do not represent an accounting cost. In contrast, the OECD 
framework art.8.16 states that all contributions should be taken into account, also those not 
directly reflected in the accounts. The determining factor is whether it is likely that 
independent enterprises would have done so in comparable circumstances.  
 
Some of the most complex issues related to CCAs are those involving contributions of 
existing intangible property (IP). Contributions like these are common when the R&D CCA is 
established in order to develop the next generation of the IP. The OECD regulation only 
indirectly addresses the issue in art. 8.23 where it is stated that no part of a contribution can 
impose royalty payments for the use of IP except to the extent that the contribution entitles 
the contributor to obtain only a right to use the intangible property belonging to a 
participant and the contributor does not also obtain a beneficial interest in the property 
itself.  To measure the contribution, first one must establish the basis upon which existing IP 
has been contributed. Does the contribution of IP include a right to use existing IP outside 
the CCA? When the basis has been established, the value must be measured. The IRS 
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provides more guidance than the OECD and has pushed for evaluating the IP based on net 
present value of future residual profits or by using market capitalization and market 
acquisition values. These values should be treated as buy-in and buy-out payments (Peters, 
Preshaw, & Luquet, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, there is great controversy regarding which asset that can be defined as 
intangible property (Heriford, Keates, Lamoureux, & Wright, 2013). Special topics of 
discussion are workforce in place, goodwill and going concern value. Overvaluing or 
undervaluing the IP is a way to manipulate the additional cost burden the entity will be given 
and thus the tax burden. In general, the fact that different countries have different 
definitions of costs depending on the nature of the contribution and that some uses regular 
transfer pricing rules to value some kinds of contribution while others are valued according 
to specific CCA rules, makes consistency difficult.  
Appropriate allocation? 
After measuring the contribution, the next step is to evaluate whether allocations are 
appropriate. The OECD Guidelines art. 8.19 states that no specific result can be provided for 
all situations, but that the question rather must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. There is, 
however, a generally accepted methodology for controlling that the allocation of the 
contributions is appropriate. Consistency between expected income and contribution is key. 
To control the consistency, shares of expected benefits must be estimated and compared 
with the contributions.  
 
The OECD guidelines art. 8.19 suggests that expected benefits should be based on 
anticipated additional income or cost savings arising from the CCA activity. In practice, 
employing these direct measures are often impracticable, and so indirect measures are more 
commonly employed (Barbenec, 2010). OECD acknowledges that indirect measures may be 
more helpful in some cases, and further suggest that allocation keys may be based on 
expected sales, units produced or sold, gross or operating profits, the number of employees 
or capital invested. The choice of allocation key should be based on the nature of the CCA 
activity and the relationship between the allocation key and the expected benefits. In terms 
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of measures, in most aspects the IRS respects the OECD framework5. The important point is 
that one chooses the most reliable estimate based on data and information available.  
 
Estimates are uncertain as they are based upon expectations. If circumstances change the 
prospects for the future, the participants should adjust proportionate shares to reflect this. 
Nonetheless, as estimates usually are tax deductible and determine the distribution of 
profits and the tax bases, firms might be tempted to exploit the uncertainty and over- or 
underestimate to shift profits to more favorable tax regimes. To avoid this from happening, 
the OECD Guidelines art. 8.20 states that the tax authorities may make inquiries if actual 
results differ widely from projections. They must then assess whether the projections would 
have been considered acceptable by independent enterprises in comparable circumstances, 
taking into account all the developments that were reasonably foreseeable by the 
participants, without using hindsight. The IRS § 1-482.7(f)(iv)(B) are more specific and 
requires that an adjustment is made if the divergence between the participants estimated 
benefit and the actual benefit share is higher than 20%. Then the estimation method applied 
will be considered unreliable.  
Consequences if not in accordance with the ALP 
If the CCA is not consistent with the ALP, the guidelines require an adjustment. The character 
of the adjustment will depend on the facts and circumstances, however, most commonly an 
adjustment of net contribution is made through imputing a balancing payment in 
accordance with art. 8.18. If the parties’ proportionate share of total contribution, adjusted 
for any balancing payments, is not consistent with the participant’s expected benefit, the tax 
authorities are entitled to adjust the contribution. Tax administrators should however try to 
avoid making minor adjustments. Adjustments should not be made based solely on data 
from a single year. (OECD, 2010a)  
If the facts and the circumstances of the agreement indicate that the reality of the 
arrangement differs from what was originally agreed by the participants, it can be 
questioned whether the arrangement was set up only to obtain more favorable tax returns. 
If this is the case, art. 8.29 states that the tax authorities can determine the tax 
                                                          
5 The Code of Federal Regulations § 1.482-7(f)(3)(iii) 
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consequences as if the terms of the agreement had been consistent with those that might 
reasonably have been expected had the arrangements involved independent entities.  
(OECD, 2010a). Where a substantial discrepancy from the arm’s length principle has been 
present over time, art. 8.30 states that the tax authorities may also disregard parts or all of 
the purported terms of a CCA. The OECD does not set forth a certain time limit as to when 
the arrangement should be adjusted, this question is up for the respective jurisdiction to 
decide. In Norway, this is regulated by the Norwegian Assessment Act.   
2.2.6 Restructuring an CCA 
In practice it is not uncommon that the participants of a CCA change during the lifetime of 
the arrangement. Restructuring the CCA is necessary when participants enter into and 
withdraw from the arrangement or their participation is limited in time. Usually participants 
enter into an agreement to gain access to new assets or technology. When the participant 
no longer reasonably can expect a benefit from any own activity relating to the CCA, the 
OECD Guidelines require that it withdraws from the arrangement. Some entities may have 
other motives than cost sharing when entering a CCA. An example could be to offshore 
assets. In order to deter firms from misusing the CCA structure, the OECD Guidelines chapter 
8.E put forth certain criterions as to how the restructuring should be executed. 
Buy-in payments 
A buy in payment is a payment made by a new entrant to an already active CCA for obtaining 
an interest in any results of former CCA activity. When a new participant enters into an 
existing agreement interests are transferred from the original participants to the entrant. 
According to the ALP they will have to be compensated, and this compensation should be 
determined based on the value of the interest the entrant gains. When calculating the value 
of the interest, the proportionate share of future benefits must be taken into account. This is 
an uncertain estimate and prone to manipulation. Art. 8.32, however, states that if previous 
CCA activity is of no value, there will be no buy-in payment. If the new entrant brings some 
earlier acquired value into the new arrangement, then this have to be withdrawn from the 
buy-in payment. This if, and only if, the parties’ respected contribution can be properly 
documented. As with valuation of regular contributions, the valuation process becomes even 




Some jurisdictions allow buy-in payment’s in the form of an ongoing royalty. This provides an 
opportunity as royalties are tax deductible (unlike many lump sum buy-in payments), but 
also a potential obstacle as a royalty may be subject to withholding tax. (Ernst & Young, 
2003) 
 
As the OECD, the IRS also require a buy-in payment for any intangible made available to the 
CCA group. In the US, the buy-in can be in the form of royalties, instalments or a lump-sum 
payment. Accepting royalties as a buy-in payment provides the CCA with a tax planning 
opportunity. This is due to the fact that royalties are tax deductible, unlike many lump sum 
buy-in payments. Royalties can also represent a potential obstacle as a royalty may be 
subject to withholding tax. (Ernst & Young, 2003). In contrast to the US, the OECD only 
accept royalties as payments if the contributor does not obtain a beneficial interest in the 
intangible property itself6. In Norway buy-in payments are required when appropriate. If 
there is a reciprocal benefit to entrants and existing participants, payments can be avoided 
(Ernst & Young, 2003). In Spain buy-in payments are allowed and treatment would be 
subject to domestic tax principles. Withholding tax should not apply to buy-in or 
contribution payments if there is a double tax treaty in place with Spain. For non-treaty 
countries, domestic withholding tax rates apply. True-up/balancing payments may be done 
at year-end to align costs with benefits. (Ernst & Young, 2003)  
Buy out-payments  
A buy-out payment is a compensation which a participant that withdraws from an already 
existing CCA for may receive from the remaining participants for an effective transfer of its 
interests in the result of past CCA activities (OECD, 2010a).  
 
If a party decides to exit an existing CCA, a compensation should be paid to this party on the 
basis of the proportionate share of future benefits generate through the contribution given. 
This is set out by the arm’s length principle. If earlier CCA activity has not generated any 
                                                          
6 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines art. 8.23 
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value, art. 8.35 states that no buy out payment should be paid. The extent of the buy-out 
payment has to be set based on the perspective of the remaining participants.  
 
If the CCA ceases to exist, the arm’s length principle require that each party receive a real 
interest in the results of the CCA activity. This interest must be in accordance with the 
proportionate share of the contributions to the CCA. In calculating this, the adjustments, e.g. 
buy-out payments, will have to be included.  
 
According to US legislation, a buy-out payment is required when a participant exists a CCA. 
In Norway, as with buy-in payment, the buy-out payments are required when appropriate 
(Ernst & Young, 2003). 
Consequences of not following the arm’s length principle 
As with any CCA, tax authorities may adjust the buy-out or buy-in payments if the arm’s 
length principle has not been followed. They can also adjust or disregard a CCA if one of the 
following criteria are met: 
- Facts and circumstances indicate that reality differs from the terms purportedly 
agreed by the participants 
- Substantial discrepancy or disproportion between purported contribution and 
benefits over time 
- The CCA is not based on sharing of costs, i.e. In service situations 
- Non-commerciality – CCA designed just for tax purposes 
The fact that the tax authorities can adjust the payments is essential for avoiding 
manipulation. However, whether the parties have set the payments with good faith or not, 
doesn’t really make any difference. If the proportionality is broken, the authorities can 






To illustrate how CCA can act as a tax planning tool, and its effect compared to other 
structures, the case study methodology has been chosen. The publicly available information 
on real CCAs is limited, as few jurisdictions collect statistics on infra-firm trade (Lanz & 
Miroudot, 2011). In Norway, enterprises are not obliged to publish specified information 
about related-party trade (Balsvik, Jensen, Møen, & Tropina, 2009). Arrangements are 
private. For this reason, a fictitious case has been created.  
 
A limitation of the case study method is that it is a simplification of the world. Many 
assumptions have to be made, and many are to a great degree unrealistic. Nonetheless, the 
main focus of the paper is not the solution of the case, but rather the process of structuring 
the CCA. By employing a simplified case constructed for this particular purpose, it is less 
burdensome to place focus on all areas of concern.  
 
The results of the analysis depend on which point of view one takes. Effects can be analyzed 
from a pure accounting perspective, an investor’s perspective or a tax perspective. The 
calculations will vary. As the objective of this paper is to illustrate tax incentives of 
employing the CCA structure, the case will be solved with a focus on the tax accounts. 
3.2 The case 
3.2.1 The pharmaceutical industry 
The global pharmaceuticals market is worth US$ 300 billion a year, a figure that WHO 
expects will rise to US$ 400 billion within three years. The industry is characterized by high 
market concentration. The ten largest drugs companies control over one-third of the market, 
several with sales of more than US$ 10 billion a year and profit margins of about 30%. Six of 
the dominating companies are based in the United States and four in Europe (World Health 
Organization, 2014). In an industry where R&D is one of the greatest costs and the risk of 
unsuccessful R&D activity is high, financial strength is a great advantage. In addition to 
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economies of scale in manufacturing, clinical trials and marketing, financially solid 
companies can invest in more R&D and diversify more. By diversifying, the company will be 
more stable over time. (Davidson & Greblov, 2005). On average, it takes about ten to fifteen 
years for a new medicine to complete the journey from initial discovery to the marketplace 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America, 2013). 
 
 
Figure: The research and development process in the pharmaceutical industry (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing 
of America, 2013) 
 
For every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that enter the pipeline, only one receives approval. 
Even medicines that reach clinical trials have only a 16% chance of approval. The process is 
costly. The average R&D investment for each new medicine is US$ 1.2 billion, including the 
cost of failures with more recent studies estimating the costs to be even higher. 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America, 2013) 
3.2.2 The Pharma Group 
Our invented multinational enterprise called Pharma is a big-sized pharmaceutical group. 
The headquarters is located in Norway. The group is highly internationalized with 
subsidiaries located in 15 countries. Pharma develops, produces and sells pharmaceutical 
products all over the world. They have R&D centers located in Norway and in the US. 
Production facilities are situated in Norway, US and Spain. To the remaining market, drugs 
are exported to local distribution centers where they are packaged and distributed to 
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pharmacies. Pharma AS is responsible for Northern Europe and Asia, Pharma SL for the rest 
of Europe, Africa and Latin America, and Pharma Inc. for North America.  
 
In 2005, the Norwegian research center started development of a new medicine against 
influenza. Tests had shown it to be 50% more effective than existing solutions. They 
patented the technology immediately. Furthermore, the plan was to introduce the product 
on the market by 2015 and R&D costs were expected to amount to US$ 1.2bn. Market 
research confirmed great interest for the product. The drug was expected to become a drug 
for the masses, a so-called blockbuster drug.    
3.2.3 Related-party trade: The basic case  
As R&D would take place in Norway and Pharma AS would be the legal owner of the patent, 
the intangible property must be made available to the wholly owned subsidiaries in Spain 
and the US. In previous related-party trade, the Pharma group had employed traditional 
structures; including direct sales and licensing. However, they had become aware that many 
of their competitors now were employing the CCA structure. The manager had also read that 
CCAs were tax efficient and thus would improve company results. Pharma was therefore 
curious to try the CCA structure.   
 
Before starting production, Pharma decided to hire some consultants to advise them on how 
they should structure the trade. They soon confirmed that the pharmaceutical patent meets 




(1) Sales and direct costs are stable over the life of the patent (after being introduced on the 
market).   
(2) No additional R&D costs would incur after production and sales have begun in Norway 
and Spain (year 1). 
(3) The operating profit margin is the same in all three countries, and is set to the industry 
average of 45% (Jousma, n.d.). In the US they charge higher prices, but they also have 
higher direct product costs.  
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(4) The cost of capital is 11%, which is the industry standard (Jousma, n.d.). 
(5) Overhead costs are not considered as the aim is to show the tax effect of using the CCA 
structure. 
(6) Inflation is zero. 
(7) To avoid complicating the case, tax treaties are disregarded. Note however, that double 
taxation thus might seem like a greater issue than it really is. 
 
The budgeted sales are the following:  
 
Due to different geographical market and varying industry structures Pharma Inc. can charge 
higher prices than AS and SL. 
 
Assuming that the firm follows the industry average is an unrealistic assumption. Within an 
industry, the results may fluctuate widely and so the average does not really provide us with 
any useful information. However, as there are no alternative values that fit better, the 
averages are still considered the best approximation for the case. Although assumptions may 
be naive, they are helpful as to illustrate the issues of current CCA legislation.   
Alternatives to CCA 
A multinational firm wanting to sell its products globally have different options as to how it 
chooses to structure the trade. 
Direct sales 
Producing independently and selling the products directly through exports is the traditional 
choice. The drug could be exported to the subsidiaries that would act as distribution centers 
or sold directly to customers. A disadvantage of direct sales is that trade costs would 
increase significantly. Transporting final goods to the US and Spain might be costly and in 
addition Pharma will be charged custom duties. Producing all of the medicine in Norway 
might also become very expensive due to higher labor costs and need for capacity 
expansion.   
Participant Sales income/year Price/unit X units
Pharma Inc 1 300 000 000               40 32 500 000                     
Pharma AS 420 000 000                  30 14 000 000                     




As Pharma has subsidiaries located abroad, a better option could be to license the intangible 
property. As with direct sales Pharma AS would have to develop the IP independently and as 
a result become the sole owner of the patent. An advantage compared to direct sales is that 
no physical transferal of goods would be necessary. Trade costs could be drastically reduced. 
The subsidiaries would undertake the production themselves and pay an arm’s length 
royalty rate in return for using the IP. Hence, less income would be transferred across 
borders, reducing issues of double taxation. 
 
Licensing IP rights to associated parties is very common. If Pharma were to use this 
structure, the drug would be developed by Pharma AS in Norway and then licensed to the US 
and Spanish subsidiaries for production and sales here. Pharma Inc. and Pharma SL would 
pay a royalty fee for using the patented technology. They would start the licensing when the 
drug is at the end of the clinical development phase, and only production and sales remains 
before the product can be found in the pharmacies.  
 
Royalties can take the form of up-front payments and milestone payments to be paid during 
the development and the royalties due once the drug enters the market. However, usually 
they are expressed as a percentage of sales, and are meant to cover part of the profits 
generated by the licensee through exploiting the invention (Jousma, n.d.). Thus, when 
structuring a licensing agreement, Pharma AS would have to set a royalty rate they could 
charge Pharma Inc. and Pharma SL for exploiting the patent.   
 
Setting the royalty rates 
The Norwegian Tax Act § 13-1 requires that Pharma AS complies with the ALP. Further 
guidance is found in the OECD Guidelines chapter 12. The rates must be set as if set between 
independent parties. Royalties are not the focus of this paper, and so a detailed analysis will 
not be undertaken. However, a basic understanding is important. 
 
To comply with the ALP, Pharma AS must expect to generate excess profits from the licensed 
patent. No independent party would enter into an agreement of licensing if the return on 
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capital invested would be lower than the cost. When setting the royalty rate, Jousma (n.d.) 
suggests that the following formula is employed:  
Royalty = X * OPM-(Ipvm/Spvm) = X*[OPM- Ipvm/Spvm] 
Where OPM = operating profit margin, Spvm = present value of sales, Ipvm = present value 
of investments and X = distribution factor. 
 
Instead of undertaking a detailed analysis to find the distribution factor (X), one can employ 
the empirically established 25% rule. This rule states that the licensees profit should be 
shared on four activities: invention, development, production and sales. The share the 
licensor is entitled to depend on which of these activities the licensor performs. The licensed 
technology often also requires that the licensee invests in additional development activities. 
Thus 25% has become a common distribution factor (Jousma, n.d.). In this case, the licensor 
also develops the drug. Hence the profit distribution X should be set equal to 50%. Pharma 
Inc. and SL do not need to make any additional investments in R&D.  
 
In the following, the royalty rate will be expressed as a percentage of sales. As the licensee 
does not need to make any additional investments, the Ipvm=0 and so the royalty rate can 
easily be found through the following formula: R = X*OPM = 0.5*0.45 = 22.5 percent.  
 
The direct product costs are the costs that completely can be attributed to the product. 
These include direct labor and material. The direct costs are assumed equal in Norway and 
Spain, US$ 16.5 per unit. It is assumed that labor is more expensive in Norway, whereas the 
material cost more in Spain, so in sum these even out. In the US, direct product costs are 
assumed to be US$ 20. The projects accounts will be equal all 10 years of the patents life. 
 
Pharma INC Year 1 Pharma SL Year 1
Expected yearly sales 1 300 000 000       Expected yearly sales 420 000 000          
Direct product costs 715 000 000          Direct product costs 231 000 000          
OPM, 45% 585 000 000          OPM, 45% 189 000 000          
Royalty payments 22,5% 292 500 000          Royalty payments 22,5% 94 500 000            
Pre tax profit margin 292 500 000          Pre tax profit margin 94 500 000            
- Corporate tax, 35% 102 375 000          - Corporate tax, 30% 28 350 000            
- Withholding tax, 30% 87 750 000            - Withholding tax royalties, 24,75% 23 388 750            
After tax profits 102 375 000          After tax profits 42 761 250            
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With royalty payments, the profits transferred are subject to a withholding tax. Pharma Inc. 
will have to pay a withholding tax on the royalty income generated in the US. For Pharma AS 
the royalties will be treated as taxable income. Hence, the royalties will be subject to double 
taxation. Shifting profits from the US to Norway with an aim of saving tax payments come at 
a cost. Although the tax rate in Norway is 8% lower than in the US, the additional cost of 
licensing will be greater than the tax reductions generated.  
 
In Spain, the rate for withholding tax is less than the rate for taxation on corporate profits. 
Consequently, the Spanish entity will be able to partially deduct royalty payments from the 
tax base. Nevertheless, as in the US, due to withholding tax it is expensive to shift profits to 
Norway.  
 
In Norway, the royalty income is taxable income. The HQ’s tax base can be reduced by 
depreciating the patent. In general, Norwegian tax law requires that R&D costs are deducted 
as they incur. Despite this, concrete projects that are or will become assets generating future 
income can be capitalized, according to the tax law § 6-25.  Pharma’s patent is an intangible 
asset, and so they decide to capitalize the cost of development. In order to depreciate the 
patent, the tax law § 14-50 requires that the value of the patent is limited in time. As a 
patent has an expiration date, and we have assumed that the value thereafter will 
deteriorate, this requirement is met. According to § 14-50, in the patent will have to be 
depreciated linearly. A linear depreciation implies that yearly depreciation in present value is 
equal to: $1,200,000,000 / 10 years = $120,000,000. Considering this, the yearly accounts of 




Expected yearly sales 300 000 000
Direct product costs 165 000 000
OPM, 45% 135 000 000
Royalty income 387 000 000
Depreciation, IP 120 000 000
Pre tax profit margin 402 000 000
- Corporate tax, 27% 108 540 000
After tax profits 293 460 000
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If using the royalty structure, the total tax burden for the group would be US$ 350.4 million. 
 
Cost Contribution Arrangement 
An alternative to licensing is that the medicine is developed by Pharma AS in Norway in 
cooperation with Pharma Inc. and Pharma SL. The result of the CCA process would be the 
patent that is expected to create benefits for all of the participants. The CCA must be 
developed in accordance with the ALP. Hence, Pharma must structure the arrangement in 
the same way that unrelated parties would. For independent parties to be willing to enter 
into the CCA, there must be consistency between contributions and expected benefits. No 
participants should receive a proportionally greater share of the benefits. To make sure the 
ALP is followed; Pharma must identify the benefits and charge contributions according to 
how these are shared. 
Step 1: Determining the value of total contributions 
The first Pharma AS will have to do when developing the CCA is to value all initial 
contributions. Contributions can come in different shapes and at different points in time. For 
instance, when setting up the CCA a participant could contribute with pre-existing rights or 
assets for use in development of new assets. In such a case, the rights or assets contributed 
would have to be valued and compensated by the other participants. To start with, for the 
purpose of this paper, it is helpful to assume that all parties contribute solely with cash. This 
might be an unrealistic assumption as the drug will be developed in the Norwegian R&D 
facilities of Pharma, however, it is necessary to avoid complicating the basic case. 
 
As no contributions of pre-existing assets has been identified, the next step is to estimate all 
future costs related to the CCA activity. Pharma will have to identify all relevant costs. The 
OECD guidelines art. 8.16 requires all contributions made by the participants are recognized, 
this including property and services that are used partly in the CCA activity and partly in the 
participants separate business activities. The IRS § 1.482-5(d)(3) goes further, and states that 
Total taxation, annually
Taxation US 190 125 000          
Taxation Spain 51 738 750            
Taxation Norway 108 540 000          
Total taxation with royalties 350 403 750          
39 
 
the relevant costs are all operating expenses, depreciation and amortization of assets, 
expenses associated with assets used, for instance, leasing expenses. Pharma has estimated 
that the total cost of producing the drug would be US$ 1.2bn. 
Step 2: Determine the allocation 
When the total pool of costs has been identified, the expected benefits must be estimated. 
The total costs of development must be shared between Pharma Inc., SL and AS according to 
the share of the benefits they expect to receive. Finding expected benefits is not 
straightforward. The economic life of the expected benefits must be estimated, a measure 
for the benefits must be identified, and the value found. The allocation of the benefits 
determines the contribution of each participant. Due to higher tax rates in the US than in 
Norway and Spain, Pharma has a tax incentive to overestimate the expected benefits of the 
US entity. Naturally, the tax authorities are of the point of view that tax considerations 
should not affect the estimation of expected benefits.  
 
The length of the period of estimated benefits 
When estimating the benefits from the CCA, it is first necessary to determine the economic 
life of the drug. This determines the number of years benefits can be received. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the technology is normally patented before the product is 
introduced on the market. It is assumed that Pharma’s patent will expire after the product 
has been 10 years on the market. 
 
This does not necessarily imply that Pharma cannot continue to produce the drug and sell it 
with a profit. However in the pharmaceutical industry, it is common that drugs are copied 
shorty after patent has expired. With competition, the profitability drops until margins are 
completely eroded. Although, an industry trend, it is not certain that this will happen to 
Pharma’s new drug. Pharma might be the exception to the rule. Moreover, the duration of 
this process may be long, and so Pharma could potentially earn great profits also several 
years after the patent’s expiration. It might also be that elements of the IP could be 
employed in further R&D activity, e.g. as a platform for future drugs. If this was the case, the 
CCA activity could indirectly create great benefits also after the expiration of the patent. If 
the outcome of the CCA activity is an asset with perpetual economic life, estimation of 
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expected benefits would be more complicated. The benefits would be considered indefinite, 
but variable. Predicting the future correctly is challenging. Uncertainty is an important 
element when estimating the economic life of the drug. 
 
To simplify, it is assumed that that Pharma’s opportunities for alternative usage of IP assets 
in the future are limited. Although it might be too simplistic, the economic life of the drug is 
limited to the life of the patent, i.e. 10 years after being introduced on the market. 
Most reliable measure 
The OECD and the IRS agrees that there is not one fixed measure that always must be 
employed for estimation. The measure that most reliably demonstrates the future share of 
benefits must be chosen. However, which measure that is most reliable may vary greatly 
from one CCA to another. What further complicates the decision is the fact that the future is 
unknown, and what is expected to be the most reliable measure today, may not turn out to 
be so. The choice is based on several elements of uncertainty, hence leaving the MNE with 
great liberty as to how it chooses the measure. To limit the MNEs ability to set measure 
freely, the OECD and IRS recommend certain measures. Expected benefits could either be 
based on anticipated additional income or cost savings arising from the CCA activity, or 
indirect measures such as allocation keys.  
 
Although some measures are recommended, Pharma can to a great degree choose how they 
want to measure the expected benefits. As long they can document that the decision is 
based on what they regard as most reliable, it is difficult for the tax authorities to control 
whether the expectations were genuine beliefs about the future or based on other 
considerations. As the measure determines how costs are allocated, tax planning may easily 
influence the choice. If tax minimization was the ultimate goal, Pharma would prefer the 
option that would shift most costs to the high-tax jurisdiction(s). If Pharma had a choice 
between different methods that all could be argued to be the most reliable one, the optimal 





If Pharma were to base the estimated benefits on cost savings they would have to identify 
the total pool of cost reductions in comparison to structuring the trade differently among 
them. A natural comparison would be in the case of royalty payments. Participation in a CCA 
would imply removal of royalty fees for Pharma SL and Pharma Inc. However, as Pharma AS 
would not develop the drug without contributions from Pharma Inc. and SL, it might be 
difficult to argue that looking at removal of royalty fees would be the most reliable measure 
for calculating expected benefits.  
 
Furthermore, the CCA would reduce costs of acquiring know-how. Pharma Inc. contributes 
with a team of researchers. This knowledge would otherwise have to be acquired at market 
prices. Other costs savings are those of economies of scale. There are many examples of 
costs that could be saved through a CCA. Nevertheless, using costs as a measure could also 
involve valuation issues. As these savings are just predictions, they are prone to over and 
underestimation. Moreover, identifying all savings before they incur can challenging.  
Additional income 
A second option is to consider expected additional income from participation in the CCA. It 
would be natural to include income from sales, but also other income such as spillover 
effects from brand building etc. With a new blockbuster drug, the Pharma brand will get a 
lot of extra publicity which can increase sales also of other drugs.  
 
Using additional income as measure could also be problematic as sales income also is 
affected by factors outside of the CCA. It might be that the US entity plan to launch a great 
marketing campaign and that it therefore expects higher sales than if it were to follow the 
marketing plan of Pharma AS. If a large share of the sales income in fact is a result of this 
campaign, Pharma Inc. would then be paying a contribution that is disproportionally high 
compared to benefits received. Differentiating what part of the income that is attributable 
to the CCA and what part is attributable to other factors is a challenging task, but simply 




If it is so that the US entity expects an income that, in proportion to the estimated cost 
savings of the CCA, is much greater than what the entities in Spain and Norway do, then an 
estimation of benefits based on income would give better results for the Pharma Group. A 
greater share of the costs would be allocated to the US entity, and as the tax rate in the US is 
higher, the total tax burden would be reduced.  
Indirect measures 
In practice, using one of the direct measures mentioned above, might be quite impractical.  
As these are aggregated measures, they might be difficult to predict reliably. Indirect 
measures are therefore more commonly applied (Barbenec, 2010). If impossible or 
impractical to calculate the additional generated income or costs saved directly, Pharma 
could use an allocation key. Depending on the objectives and circumstances of the CCA, 
possible allocation keys include sales value, sales volumes, units produced, the number of 
employees, gross or operating profit, assets, values or capital invested.  
 
The benefits could be estimated according to one of the following methods:  
(1) Units produced or sold: This is recommended when each controlled participant is 
expected to have a similar increase in net profit or decrease in net loss attributable to 
the exploitation of a unit of the result of the CCA. This requires that units are 
identifiable and capable of separate use. 
(2) Sales: When the benefit is attributable to the increase in profit or decrease in loss 
from each incoming financial unit, sales could be a suitable indirect basis for 
measuring benefits. For participants operating at the same market level, selling the 
same or similar product directly in different geographical markets, sales could be a 
good indicator of future benefits. However if some participants sell their product 
through a distributor, the market level would not be the same, and sales would not 
be a proper measure.    
(3) Operating profit: This is generally recommended where the derive results from the 
CCA is integral to the core business of the participants and has a direct effect of the 
profitability of the business. This is also a good measure if the participants will derive 
different profits from the sales. 
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(4) Other basis: In practice other measures are also employed. What is the proper 
measure depends on the conditions of the CCA.  
(5) General analysis based on valuation of the controlled participants’ companies, also 
called the investor model. 
Differences in financial reporting (e.g. revenue recognition) may complicate the measuring 
of benefits. Ideally, the benefits should be measured based on a single financial reporting 
basis. However in practice, this is very impracticable. (Barbenec, 2010) 
 
Although Pharma probably could argue for using several of these measures. In the 
continuation of this case, it is assumed that sales income would be the best measure. The 
argument is that for Pharma the benefit from the drug is clearly linked to the additional sales 
income.  
Finding the value of Pharma’s sales  
The value of sales is based on predictions about the future. Due to this element of 
uncertainty, it is prone to over- and underestimation. The expected value of sales can be 
read out of the budget. Moreover, the fact that Pharma’s entities employ different 
regulative frameworks for accounting may also affect the income reported. E.g. the IFRS and 
the US GAAP are different in terms of revenue reporting. To be able to compare the income 
reported by the different entities, ideally, they would employ a unified financial reporting 
framework. Due to extra workload, this would be impracticable and an unreasonable 
requirement. 
Finding the shares 
In total the medicine will be sold in all countries where Pharma has an establishment. 
Pharma has estimated that expected income from sales of the drug will be evenly spread 
over the ten-year period of the patent. According to the budget, sales of the medicine will 
give Pharma Inc. a yearly income of US$ 1,300m, Pharma SL US$ 420m and Pharma AS US$ 
300m. It is assumed that there are no additional income from the results of the CCA.  
 
When we know the yearly income we can easily calculate the expected benefits. If the 
economic life of the patent would be different across the states, one would have to calculate 
the present value of the discounted yearly sales income. For discounting the flow of income, 
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the cost of capital should be employed instead of the entity’s internal rate of return (Jousma, 
n.d.). The reason is that the CCA is considered a separate project with a different risk than 
the ordinary operations of the enterprise. The CCA involves production of an intangible 
asset, thus the risk must be considered higher than the normal enterprise risk, which should 
be reflected in the discount rate. In the pharmacy industry the average cost of capital 
employed is 11%.   
 
The discount rate is set by Pharma itself. Thus, the rate is prone to manipulation. A higher 
discount rate will result in reduced present benefits. In this case, the expected sales are 
constant for all participants and so long as the same discount rate is employed, this will not 
affect the shares. However, if Pharma AS expected sales would grow over times, whereas 
the others did not, a higher discount rate would result in Pharma AS being allocated less 
costs than what they rightly should.  
 
In this case the sales are constant over the economic life of the asset, and as the same 
discount rate is employed on all participant’s contributions, there is no need in discounting 
the future sales to find the allocation key. The respective shares would be the same 
regardless. The allocation of contribution would then be based upon the share of total sales 
income each participants receive:  
 
 
As the medicine is more costly in the US, this measure imply a that a greater share of 
expected benefits will be measured in the US than if the measure was number of units. If the 
number of units sold was to be the benchmark, the allocation would be the following:  
 
 
Distribution of benefits Sales income Share of total
Pharma Inc 13 000 000 000 64 %
Pharma SL 4 200 000 000 21 %
Pharma AS 3 000 000 000 15 %
Total 20 200 000 000 100 %
Distribution of benefits Number of units Share of total
Pharma Inc 32 500 000 58 %
Pharma SL 14 000 000 25 %
Pharma AS 10 000 000 18 %
Total 56 500 000 100 %
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From the two different allocation keys, we clearly see that sales income will shift a greater 
share of the costs to Pharma Inc. The tax effect of this decision can be illustrated through 
comparing the resulting tax deduction of the two allocation measures: 
 
 
This illustrates the importance of what measure is applied. The yearly difference between 
the tax deductions of the two measures is approximately US$ 510 000. In ten years that will 
amount to US$ 5.1 million.  
 
Employing operating profits does not make much sense as the link between the product and 
the entities total profits is likely to be vague. As a great pharmaceutical group, the entities 
do produce and sell many different drugs and so the final profits do not reflect the benefits 
each derive from selling the influenza medicine. The investor model could also be employed, 
though this would require that Pharma calculated the NPV of the investment in the drug for 
the entities. This process requires more work. If taxes are not taken into account, the 
resulting allocation key would be similar to when using sales income as measure. This is due 
to the fact that the operating profit margins are the same across the entities.  
 
With sales income as measure, if we transfer these costs to the accounts of the parties, the 
yearly tax accounts of the project will look the following: 
 
Allocation key













Pharma Inc 58 % 69 026 549 24 159 292 64 % 77 227 723 27 029 703
Pharma Sl 25 % 29 734 513 8 920 354 21 % 24 950 495 7 485 149
Pharma AS 18 % 21 238 938 5 734 513 15 % 17 821 782 4 811 881
Total 100 % 120 000 000 38 814 159 100 % 120 000 000 39 326 733
Units Sales income
Pharma Inc Pharma SL
Expected yearly sales 1 300 000 000       Expected yearly sales 420 000 000          
Direct product costs 715 000 000          Direct product costs 231 000 000          
OPM, 45% 585 000 000          OPM, 45% 189 000 000          
Contribution payments 77 227 723            Contribution payments 24 950 495            
Pre tax profit margin 507 772 277          Pre tax profit margin 164 049 505          
- Corporate tax, 35% 177 720 297          - Corporate tax, 30% 49 214 851            




In contrast to royalties, contributions do not represent any income for the receiver. The 
OECD Guidelines art. 8.23 emphasizes that contributions should not constitute any royalty 
payment. Contributions should be treated in the same manner as if they were given to an 
external party performing the CCA activity. Whether the contributions are tax deductible 
depends on the nature of the contribution. Contributions received are simply seen as a 
reimbursement of costs and is therefore not taxable income.  
 
In the CCA of the Pharma group the participants have agreed that all will gain their own right 
to produce the medicine. The tax base of Pharma AS is thus smaller than with royalties.  
 
 
Based on the assumptions and calculations from above, the total taxation on group level will 
be the following: 
 
 
Finally it is important to note that many of these calculations are based on uncertain 
estimates and that the solution easily could have been very different. There is not one 
correct answer as to how such a situation should be solved.  
Pharma AS
Expected yearly sales 300 000 000          
Direct product costs 165 000 000          
OPM, 45% 135 000 000          
Contribution payments 17 821 782            
Pre tax profit margin 117 178 218          
- Corporate tax, 27% 31 638 119            
After tax profits 85 540 099            
Total taxation, annually
Taxation US 177 720 297          
Taxation Spain 49 214 851            
Taxation Norway 31 638 119            
Total taxation 258 573 267          
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Comparing the CCA with the alternatives 
On group level, there is a significant reduction in tax liability when employing CCA instead of 
royalties. The decrease is due to two reasons: (1) contributions from Pharma Inc. and 
Pharma SL are not subject to withholding taxes, and (2) contributions to the CCA are not 
taxable income in the country of development in contrast to royalties which are reported as 
income. In comparison with royalties, the CCA structure reduces the Pharma group’s overall 
tax liability.  
 
 
Moreover, the CCA activity is located in Norway, the low-tax jurisdiction. As tax planning 
strategies usually imply transferring profits to the low-tax jurisdiction, one would expect that 
replacing royalty fees with cost contributions would not be beneficial. If the Pharma AS 
rather charged the US entity royalty fees, a greater share of the profits would be shifted to 
the low-tax country. Royalty fees are always greater than cost contributions as a profit 
element must be included in the fee calculated. The results would also depend on the 
royalty set.  
 
When we in spite of this still see that CCA result in tax reductions, the reason is elimination 
of withholding tax in Spain and the US in addition to taxation of royalty income in Norway. If 
the CCA was located in the US the incentive for employing the CCA structure would be even 
greater.  
 
This basic case illustrates that the flexibility of the regulation enables CCA to act as a tax 
planning tool in related-party trade.  
Contribution of pre-existing assets to the CCA 
All contributions should be taken into account, also contributions such as tangible and 
intangible assets and contributions made in-kind. If a party contributes with all the know-
Total taxation, annually Royalties Cost Contribution R-CCA
Taxation US 190 125 000          177 720 297                           12 404 703            
Taxation Spain 51 738 750            49 214 851                             2 523 899               
Taxation Norway 108 540 000          31 638 119                             76 901 881            
Total taxation, yearly 350 403 750          258 573 267                           91 830 483            
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how, this should be reflected in the contributions. But how do you really put a price tag on 
the know-how contributed? Or utilization of an existing patent?  
Valuation of initial contributions 
As mentioned in the basic case, the first Pharma AS will have to do when developing the CCA 
is to value all initial contributions of pre-existing assets. All contributions in the form of cash, 
services, tangible property and intangible property should be accounted for in the pool of 
costs.  
 
The initial contributions should be compensated through balancing payments. Pharma AS 
contributes with tangible assets such as research equipment they already possess. This 
equipment is also employed in other R&D projects. Pharma Inc. has a great research lab in 
the US and wish to contribute with some of its assets. It will contribute with a patented 
technology for a research device that dramatically would improve the R&D process. In 
addition it has highly skilled researchers. A team is sent to Norway to partake in the process. 
The Spanish subsidiary do not contribute with any pre-existing assets.   
 
The valuation of the contributions must be done on a consistent basis. The US requires that 
contributions are valued at cost, while the OECD leaves the question up to the respective 
jurisdiction to decide. Norway and Spain bases the valuation on the ALP, which often signify 
market value. When jurisdictions employ different valuation techniques, the process gets 
more complicated.  
Team of researchers 
The value of the team of researcher must be estimated. In the US, the valuation of 
workforce contributed is a hotly debated topic (Heriford, Keates, Lamoureux, & Wright, 
2013). First, one could argue that the contribution would simply be the people; the flesh-
and-blood individuals. If this was so, the contribution could be considered a tangible asset. 
However, in a technology intensive industry it is not the employees that are the assets, it is 
rather their skills. As the case states, these workers are highly skilled and bring a great pool 
of knowledge with them. The research team would therefore be considered intangible 
assets. The “commitment” of a research team’s “experience and expertise” to intangible 
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development under the CCA can be considered as a platform contribution. However, the 
salaries of the research team can also represent an ongoing operating contribution.  
 
The OECD does not provide any concrete guidelines for how Pharma should value 
contributions. It should be determined on a case-to-case basis, where the determining factor 
should be what would have been done in an uncontrolled transaction. IRS on the other 
hand, has pushed for IP being valued according to one of two techniques (Peters, Preshaw, & 
Luquet, 2004):  
(1) The investor model: Setting the value of the research team equal to the net present 
value of all future residual profits, even when these are being generated by 
intangibles that clearly have been developed under the R&D CCA; and 
(2) The acquisition model: Using market capitalization and market acquisition values to 
determine the value of the buy-in of the team. In some cases this value may 
significantly exceed the NPV of future profits and in effect this will imply allocating 
more than 100% of profits to the original IP owner.  
 
To ensure consistency with the ALP, the decision must be based on what best reflects the 
real value of the contribution. As the link between the present value of future net profits and 
the contribution of the know-how of the researchers may be ambiguous, using the investor 
model seems unreasonable. If valuation was to be based on market acquisition, it would be 
necessary to find the market price of engaging a comparable team of researchers. When 
finding a team to compare with, the market of comparison must be chosen. Prices vary, 
depending on the market of consideration. Thus there might be great disparity between 
market value and costs. Salaries in Norway and the US differ widely. So does taxes and 
benefits, which is a part of the cost of employment. One could argue that a comparable 
team should be found in Norway as Pharma AS is located here and that they alternatively 
would hire researchers in Norway. But as the team is American, one could also argue that 
the comparable team should be so. On the other hand, acquiring an American team 
independently could be challenging. There might be structural barriers.  
 
In general, finding a comparable team might be difficult as the researchers have acquired a 
lot of company and industry specific knowledge. Simply looking at the cost of having a 
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similar team employed may also be insufficient. The value of the know-how is not always 
reflected in the salaries, as the entity additionally may have incurred great training costs. If 
we assume that their salary reflects the value of their knowledge, the cost of having the 
researchers employed on the project could be a good estimate for the value of the 
contribution. A weakness of such a strategy is that the value of the know-how is not always 
reflected in the salaries, as the entity additionally may have incurred great training costs. 
Yet, Pharma decides to use total cost of having current team employed, including benefits 
and taxes, as an estimate of the contribution.  
Plant and equipment 
The contribution of Pharma AS would have to be valued in accordance with the ALP. For 
Pharma SL and AS, the determining factor would be what an independent third party would 
pay for the equipment and the plant. The contribution of the plant and equipment could be 
viewed as a platform contribution, a lump sum payment paid as if the assets were bought by 
the CCA, or as an operating contribution, in the form of alternative rent of plant and 
equipment. A third alternative would be that Pharma AS was compensated partially for a 
platform contribution and partially or an operating contribution. However, if the parties 
were independent, and the plant and property were used partially in the CCA activity and 
partially in the separate business activity of Pharma AS, it is likely to assume that Pharma 
would charge a rent for letting others employ their assets.  
 
When the nature of the contributed pre-existing asset has been defined, the next would be 
to find the value of this contribution. Market prices or prices of comparable transaction are 
good estimates for the AL price. Even if there were no identical plants to compare with, one 
could estimate a value based on the prices of similar ones. Unfortunately uncertainty cannot 
be eliminated completely.  
 
An independent participant would be willing to pay a rent that covered the cost of the 
owner plus a markup. If a comparable arrangement between independent parties can be 
identified, its price should be used as an example. Finding an arrangement that has the same 
term and circumstances might be impossible. A solution could be to see what the regular 
markup for rental of equipment and plant is, and add this to the identified costs. Therefore, 
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Pharma AS’s costs must be identified. As it is assumed that the equipment partially is being 
used in CCA activity and partially in separate business activity, it is useful to identify the 
proportion of total capacity the project utilizes. If capacity is measured by hours, the number 
of hours the CCA utilizes must be found. A weakness of such a measure is that the number of 
hours attributable to the CCA activity could easily be over- or underestimated, as it is 
difficult to control for external parties.  
Patent for new research device 
When Pharma Inc. contributes with a patent to the CCA, it will have to decide what rights 
the other participants will be given in relation to this. The question is whether the actual 
rights transferred should be make and sell rights or use rights. Both allow Pharma AS to 
manufacture and sell the R&D device, however the use rights in additionally allows Pharma 
AS to use the patent to conduct future R&D (Heriford, Keates, Lamoureux, & Wright, 2013). 
 
For Pharma this distinction is important to make as the amortization and thereby the value 
of the contribution depends on the economic life of the pre-existing intangible property. 
Make and sell rights can be valued by applying comparable license arrangements in which 
royalties are typically paid up to the point that the patent expires. The use rights on the 
other hand is typically seen to have perpetual economic life as they represent a platform of 
IP knowledge that makes future R&D more efficient and effective (Heriford, Keates, 
Lamoureux, & Wright, 2013).  
 
According to the US, the valuation of the contribution must be based on accounting costs. 
For the patent, the cost would be the amortization cost of the patent. The US, Section 197 of 
the Internal Revenue Code requires that intangible assets are amortized over 15 years. If the 
IP contributed is created by the contributor itself however, Section 174 requires it to be 
amortized over 60 months or more. However, if the patent also is employed in R&D activities 
separate from the CCA, this must be taken into account. The CCA cannot be expected to 
cover the entire amortization cost. Pharma must find a method to share the amortization 




The period of amortization vary between different countries. In Spain, the amortization 
depends on the useful life of the intangible asset7. For both intangible assets with indefinite 
useful life and with a defined, the amortization is limited to 10 percent of its value. In 
Norway, an IP which is a right with limited life, should be depreciated linearly over its life8. If 
the asset does not have a set time limit, the determining factor is whether the IP has limited 
economic life. If the tax payer can prove the limited life, then it can be depreciated over the 
life of the asset, acc. the Norwegian tax law § 6-1. If it has perpetual economic life it can only 
be amortized if tax payer can illustrate the value is decreasing. The fact that jurisdictions 
differs greatly in amortization of IP illustrates that although all contributions are valued on a 
cost basis, the valuation may differ greatly. Thus, achieving complete consistency in 
valuation is hardly realistic.  
 
When pre-existing assets contributed have been valued, Pharma will continue as in the basic 
case with finding the total pool of contributions to be covered by the CCA. For Pharma, 
relevant costs would be depreciation of plant and equipment, maintenance of equipment, 
salaries to staff and other operating costs. Pharma will have to estimate the length of the 
period of the expected benefits, decide what measure it considers to be the most reliable 
measure and finally calculate the value of the benefits. When benefits have been found, 
shares can easily be estimated. And so balancing payments can be set.  
3.2.4 CCA entry 
Pharma Inc. and Pharma AS started the CCA activity without the participation of Pharma SL. 
After 5 years of production, Pharma SL decides to join the arrangement. Pharma Inc. and AS 
estimated that they had performed about half of the R&D activities they would need before 
product would be ready for sales.    
 
In order for Pharma SL to enter the CCA it has to have expectations of receiving benefits 
from participation. No independent party would enter into an arrangement if there were no 
prospects of benefits. Fortunately, Pharma SL has identified a great interest for the drug in 
                                                          
7 Articles 11[1] and 12[2] of the Real Decreto Legislativo 4/2004 of March 5 2004 
8 The Norwegian General Tax Act §14-50 
53 
 
its markets and is expected to generate great income. Thus the arrangement has economic 
substance. 
 
After confirming substance, the parties would have to estimate the buy-in price Pharma SL 
should be charged for entry. When Pharma SL enters the CCA arrangement it will obtain an 
interest in results of prior CCA activity. This could be intangible property developed through 
the CCA, work in-progress and knowledge obtained from past CCA activities. In effect, the 
existing participants transfer part of their respective interests to Pharma SL. Accordingly, the 
new participant would have to make a buy-in payment as a compensation for the transfer. 
On the other hand, if the results of past CCA activity are of no value, then no buy-in should 
be required. Consequently, the parties would have to value results of prior CCA activity and 
pre-existing assets. The compensation must be set based on arm’s length value. The 
fundamental question is whether earlier CCA activity has generated any results. An element 
of discussion is whether failed R&D activity should be reimbursed. If the results of the R&D 
so far only are rejected trials, it might be difficult for Pharma AS and Inc. to argue that the 
buy-in of Pharma SL also should cover their failures.  
 
Nevertheless, the results of past CCA activity may have value even if regarded as failed R&D. 
Know-how gained through failures may have value for future R&D. Discovering what does 
not work is often an important step in the process of learning what actually does. For every 
successfully developed pharmaceutical drug there are typically thousands of unsuccessful 
experiments on various compounds. Where past CCA activity is failed R&D, it will have no 
value only if there is no knowledge or other benefit obtained that is expected to have value 
for any future R&D activity (Australian Taxation Office, 2004). If Pharma argues that the 
failed R&D has provided the researchers with know-how needed to develop the final 
product, a portion of the prior R&D costs should be reimbursed. It is difficult for the tax 
administrators to control that the valuation of prior R&D is made in good faith, and so there 
is great potential for value being over- or underestimated.  
 
Valuing previous CCA activity and a partially developed pharmaceutical can be challenging. It 
may not always be possible or practicable to accurately and reliably estimate the market 
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value of the results of past CCA activity for these purposes.  Most likely there are no 
comparable assets nor market values to base the valuation upon.  
The effect on taxation  
The US and the Norwegian entity have shared CCA costs equally between them up until this 
point. Half of the reimbursement would therefore be paid to the US entity where it would 
imply a tax increase of 35%*Payment, and the second half would be paid to the entity 
located in Norway, where it would increase tax payments by 27%*Payment.  
 
By assuming that the R&D costs are evenly spread over the ten years of development, and 
that all prior R&D will generate future benefits, the rightful buy-in would be 1/3 of the $600 
million previously spent on R&D. Each party will be reimbursed $100m each. The overall tax 
effect can then be found:  
 
 
Through a decrease in tax deductible costs, the US entity would increase its tax liability. The 
same would happen with Pharma AS. In Spain however, the buy-in would be tax deductible 
and so Pharma SL would be able to reduce tax payments by US$ 60m. The total effect on the 
group would be an increase in the overall tax burden. By underestimating the value of prior 
CCA activities, the Pharma group could reduce taxes payable. This illustrates why buy-ins are 
subject to great scrutiny from tax administrators. 
3.2.5 One party decides to leave the CCA  
Let us go back to the basic case. All three participants join the CCA in 2005. However, after 3 
years, the US entity decides to withdraw from the arrangement. They argue that Pharma Inc. 
has discovered a new drug they believe have more market potential and that they don’t 
Reimbursement 
Buy-in payment 200 000 000          
Tax effects:
Tax US, 35% 35 000 000            
Tax Norway, 27% 27 000 000            
Tax Spain, 30% -60 000 000           
Change in overall tax liability 2 000 000               
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have the resources to participate in the CCA too. Their expected benefits of CCA 
participation seems to have been deteriorated. 
 
With withdrawal Pharma Inc. leaves its interest in the past CCA activity to the other 
participants. This include intangible property that the CCA already had developed, work-in-
process activities and the knowledge that the participant has obtained from the CCA’s past 
activities. The OECD art. 8.34 states that the party withdrawing must be compensated for its 
interest. If previous CCA activity is of no value however, there should be no buy-out 
payments.  
 
The buy-out payment should be set under the ALP and the perspective of the remaining 
participants, Pharma AS and SL, should be considered9. If the withdrawal of Pharma Inc. 
results in an identifiable and quantifiable reduction in the value of the continuing CCA 
activity a buy-out payment would not be appropriate.  
No property to be transferred 
If the previous R&D failures cannot be seen to have provided any new knowledge that can 
be advantageous in terms of future R&D activities, Pharma Inc. cannot expect to receive a 
buy-out payment. In an uncontrolled transaction, naturally no buy-out would be paid if there 
were no value to be transferred.  
 Property to be transferred 
Pharma Inc., SL and AS have created the drug and performed successful testing. The 
technology has been patented. The prior CCA activity certainly is valuable. When leaving the 
CCA, Pharma Inc. should be compensated.  
First, a valuation of the property transferred must be undertaken. As mentioned in the case 
of buy-in payments, valuing previous R&D failures is problematic. Tax concerns may lead to 
over- and underestimation of the value. For the tax authorities it is difficult to prove bad 
faith in estimation. Thus, if Pharma’s objective was to minimize overall tax liability, they 
                                                          
9 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines art. 8.35 
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would try to transfer profits from the high-taxed entity in the US to the low-taxed entity in 
Norway. This could be achieved through understating previous CCA activity.  
Although past CCA activity is considered of value, the withdrawal of the US entity may affect 
the value negatively. The importance of the departing participant to the CCA may signify that 
the new interests of the remaining participants in the results of the CCA activity are of lesser 
value than their former interests. For instance, the absence of contributions to future CCA 
activity that the departing participant otherwise would have made (e.g. highly skilled 
technical staff) may adversely affect the completion, and hence the value of work in progress 
at the time of withdrawal. If the withdrawal of a participant harm a remaining participant by 
reducing the value of its interest, the terms of a CCA between independent parties might be 
expected to call for a payment from the departing participant to the remaining participant. 
(Australian Taxation Office, 2004). This must also be accounted for. 
When Pharma Inc. leaves the CCA, it may give up any interest in the results of CCA activity 
performed after its withdrawal. However, it may agree with the remaining participants to 
retain some or all of its interest in the results of past CCA activity. Pharma Inc. may be able 
to exploit that interest, without needing any interest in the results of CCA activity performed 
after its withdrawal. Where it retains its interest it may later exploit that interest without 
payment to the remaining participants. For instance, it may exploit its rights under the CCA 
to use information, know-how or other intangible property resulting from past CCA activity 
without payment of a royalty to the remaining participants. In this case there is no buy-out 
payment to the departing participant in respect of such rights (Australian Taxation Office, 
2004). 
As a matter of commercial reality, whether Pharma Inc. were to use its knowledge resulting 
from past CCA activity is something that the remaining participants may have little ability to 
deny or verify. This may particularly be so with regard to legally unprotected know-how. 
Given this, independent parties might ordinarily be expected to agree that the departing 
participant has retained its interest in and rights to use such knowledge, so that no buy-out 




4.1 CSA as an efficient tax planning tool? 
As the analysis shows, compared to licensing, the CCA structure can be beneficial for tax 
purposes. The benefits of the CCA structure stems mainly from the fact that market prices 
are replaced by costs, but also from elimination of withholding taxes.  
 
A structure of internal trade through direct sales has not been compared to the CCA 
structure in this thesis. The reason is that production in one state with direct sales to the 
others is different in nature. As production would be centralized in the country of 
development, the cost structures of the entities would differ from in a CCA. In addition, 
trade costs would be greater due to physical transferal of goods across borders. As a 
different cost structure affect the tax base, comparison is difficult when this effect is 
unknown.  
 
As previously mentioned, the analysis shows that the CCA can be a tax efficient structure, 
but this does depend on a set of variables. The respective tax systems of the jurisdictions 
involved and the structure of the arrangement play an important part when determining 
what structure that is most beneficial. If R&D takes place in the high-tax jurisdiction a CCA 
would usually be advantageous as royalty payments including a markup are replaced by 
costs. The group as a whole would want to limit profits from shifting to the jurisdiction that 
taxes corporate profits the most. In contrast, if R&D is situated in the low-tax jurisdiction, 
the decision depends on how royalties are treated for tax purposes. The question is whether 
the jurisdictions impose taxation on royalty income and whether royalty payments are tax-
deductible.  
 
It is also important to note that the comparison of licensing and CCA is heavily reliant on the 
royalty rate set. One should therefore not put too much emphasis on the final values in the 
analysis, but rather the process. The important point is what the analysis tells us about 
employing the two structures in tax planning. The analysis shows is that the CCA structure 
relies heavily on estimates, predictions about the future and valuation techniques chosen. 
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To a certain degree, so does the licensing structure, though not to the same extent. 
Valuation issues in licensing are related to the process of setting the royalty fee. As licensing 
has become very common, techniques for setting an arm’s length royalty rate have been 
developed and liberty has been limited. Furthermore there are many prior arrangements 
one can compare with. This hinders the firm from setting a highly divergent rate.  
 
There is less experience with CCAs. Previously their occurrence were usually limited to 
certain industries. This makes CCAs less of a subject to comparison. Each CCA must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The analysis shows that there are many valuation issues 
and elements prone to manipulation.  
 
First, when identifying and valuing contributions there are several issues that arises. Valuing 
contributions can be troublesome due to differing domestic regulation and practice as to 
what method to employ. In the US contributions should be valued at cost, while the OECD 
recommends the ALP, which usually imply a market based valuation. At the same time, 
regulation recommends consistency in valuation. If the concern for domestic regulation 
conflicts with the consistency principle, the process gets more complex. Contribution of 
intangibles is the most sensitive part of a valuation. Valuing contributions made in kind such 
as know-how can be very difficult, and thus easy to over- or underestimate.  
 
Second, estimation of expected benefits is another trouble area. The economic life of the 
asset being developed must be found. As this is based on predications about the future, it is 
prone to manipulation. The allocation of the expected benefits depends on what measure 
the participants argue is most relevant. Both indirect and direct measures can be chosen, 
and the method will further determine the allocation of cost and tax bases. The same 
accounts for the amount of expected benefits, which depends on what values the 
participants expect the measure to take. Furthermore, the valuation of expected benefits 
depends on the discount rate. As expected benefits should be discounted to present values, 
the rate the MNE deems to be correct can affect the final allocation.  
 
A third issue is related to restructuring a CCA. For buy-in and buy-out payments the value of 
previous R&D activities will have to be estimated. The future benefit of prior R&D is an 
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uncertain amount. It is also difficult to control in retrospect. Attributing future benefits to 
different elements in the total R&D process is a complicated task. For buy-outs another issue 
is which rights the departing participants gets. The buy-out price must consider whether the 
participant will be using prior knowledge and technology developed in separate business 
activities. It is difficult to control whether knowledge from the CCA actually has been 
employed or not.  
 
All of the issues mentioned, permits CCAs to be employed as a tax planning tools. By over 
and underestimating the value of contributions and expected benefits, the CCA can be 
structured as to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. What the analysis shows is that there is 
a great freedom of choice when structuring CCAs. Thus MNEs may be tempted to structure 
CCAs in a more tax efficient way.  
 
The fact that each case must be viewed in isolation from other cases makes the process of 
controlling CCAs an expensive and time consuming task for the tax authorities. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to prove that assumptions about the future were estimated in bad faith. If the 
outcomes differ from predictions, it is difficult to prove it is due to a tax minimization 
strategy. Thus, the tax administrators have limited ability of sanctioning MNEs for 
manipulating estimates.   
 
In Spain, the CCAs have been given little attention. This even though CCAs are rather 
common. This is disturbing as the analysis shows that the CCA structure offers various 
options for aggressive tax planning. The participants has to make many assumptions about 
the future when setting up a CCA, and for the tax authorities it is difficult to prove that these 
assumptions were made in bad faith and as a part of a tax minimization strategy. 
  
The analysis shows why tax administrators should place more focus on the CCA structure. 
Perhaps should emphasis be put on developing a uniform international framework, creating 
better procedures for controlling CCAs, or limit choices in valuation? An international 
standard could solve issues that arise from differing regulation across states, but would be 
challenging as it requires international cooperation and compliance. Simpler procedures for 
controlling CCAs could deter more firms from misusing the structure as risk of being 
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sanctioned would increase. Limiting the MNEs choices in valuation might also be fruitful, but 
difficult as previously allowed alternatives must be banned. In conclusion, in order to 
recommend exact measures to be taken, more work is needed. Thus only a general 
recommendation can be given: tax authorities should place more focus on researching and 
improving the CCA framework.  
4.2 Implication for managerial control 
Tax management has changed drastically over the last decades. Previously taxes were seen 
as fixed costs of doing business, and tax rates imposed where taken as given. With increased 
international trade, however, MNEs have realized that the way trade is structured may have 
great implications for the total tax burden. Taxes are often seen as a regular costs and as 
cost accountants aim at maximizing firm value, reducing taxes is a common focus. 
Profitability may also be the basis upon which a bonus is paid. The managers may therefore 
have personal incentives for implementing tax planning.  
 
For a large multinational group, generating yearly profits worth millions of dollars, an 
effective tax of 5% on corporate profits instead of 27% implies great savings. Domestic 
companies do not have this opportunity. Hence, tax planning favor MNEs by providing them 
with a competitive advantage. This may encourage managers to establish entities abroad 
sooner than what they otherwise would have and thereby contributes to greater 
international capital flows.   
4.3 Where are we heading?  
As already mentioned, international trade has increased rapidly the last decade. Global value 
chains have grown more common and related-party trade correspondingly. Multinationals 
with entities in many different locations are seeing the value of cooperation across borders. 
In 2009, intra-firm trade represented as much as 48% of imports and 30% of exports in the 
US (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). In 2011, the European Commission estimated that as much as 
two-thirds of all transactions were between related parties (Lanz & Miroudot, 2011). The last 
decades this trade has only increased, and we have no reason to believe that this pattern 




As MNEs are outsourcing a greater number of business functions than ever before, the 
potential benefits of tax planning are increasing. With a higher volume of related-party 
transactions, the way the entity chooses to structure these transactions will have greater 
impact on total profitability. Therefore more emphasis will be put on having tax efficient 
structures.  
 
Tax planning is gaining increased media coverage. The public’s condemnation of tax planning 
can act as an additional barrier for firms considering tax planning strategies. MNEs that value 
a good reputation and want to be perceived as a social responsible firm, may thus avoid tax 
planning. The firm’s reputation is more important than the potential tax savings.  However, 
increased awareness of the opportunities that exist and the number of firms utilizing tax 
planning, can also encourage new MNEs to join the “game”. As strategic tax planning is 
becoming normal, it is gaining accept in the business world. Which effect the increased 
media coverage will have, remains to be seen. 
 
The international community is currently putting great emphasis on the issue of tax planning 
and base erosion. In the BEPS report from 2013, the OECD announced there is a need for 
change. The existing systems for international taxation are not sufficient (OECD, 2013a). 
Although the CCA structure is a part of this issue, it has not been the main focus of this work. 
The royalty structure has been subject to more criticism and scrutiny. The amount of 
attention it has been given, may decrease its attractiveness. MNEs may want to avoid to 
employ the structure. Knowledge and technology are assets which are increasingly being 
traded internationally (Kleinert, 2004). If royalties are considered unappealing, MNEs will 
search for alternative ways to structure related-party trade of these assets.  
 
A CCA might be the solution for many MNEs. Existing CCA legislation relies on the ALP, this 
although it often is difficult to find AL prices for transfers of knowledge and technology. This 
makes CCA an attractive tax planning tool. Moreover, reviewing consistency with the ALP or 





There is an urgent need for changes in international tax legislation. And I do believe change 
will come. However, how the OECD and the international community decides to solve issues 
of tax planning is difficult to predict. As some countries actually benefit from the current 
situation, not all will applaud a reform. In addition, many MNEs have substantial political 
power and influence. This, they might use to oppose changes. For MNEs that have spent vast 
amounts on structuring arrangement in a tax efficient manner, clearly changes legislative 
changes are unattractive. As CCAs tax planning features gives the MNEs a competitive 
advantage over domestic firms, they will resist loosing this.  
 
The increasing popularity of CCAs can be because they simplify cooperation across borders, 
but can also be due to its role as a tax planning tool. CCAs are advantageous for several 
reasons, and as more firms are realizing the benefits of the structure I believe CCAs only will 
become more prevalent. This, until legislative reforms reduce its attractiveness. 
 
As has been commented numerous times throughout this thesis, the future is uncertain and 
difficult to predict. I do however believe the work on base erosion eventually will bear fruits, 
and that the legislators also will realize the need for a more exhaustive regulation of cost 
contribution arrangements.  
5 Concluding remarks  
The focus of this thesis is Cost Contribution Arrangements as a tool in tax planning. The aim 
has been to illustrate how current legislation facilitates the use of CCAs in strategic tax 
planning. The paper shows that the structure of the CCA depends on a great set of decisions 
and uncertain estimates. In a CCA the final allocation of costs rests on the valuation of 
contributions, expected benefits, buy-ins and buy-outs. These are all are prone to 
manipulation. Their nature allows for over- and underestimation. 
 
Furthermore, it can be a difficult task for the tax administrators to control consistency with 
the Arm’s Length Principle. As each CCA is assessed on a case-by-case basis, the process is 
both costly and complicated. Proving that estimation has been done in bad faith is 




 As the paper demonstrates, current legislation does not sufficiently address the CCA 
structure. Due to an increase in global value chains and transfers of knowledge and 
technology, it is probable that the structure only will become more common. I believe the 
tax authorities should take a proactive approach and focus on improving the CCA framework 
before it becomes a severe problem. More focus and research on the topic is therefore 
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7.1 Attachment 1: Comparison of CCAs with the licensing structure.  
CCAs on services not creating IP Licensing of intragroup services 
Sharing of costs, risks and benefits where all 
participants contribute in cash or in kind  
Limited to the provision or acquisition of a service 
by members of the MNE Group. The risk of not 
successfully and efficiently providing the service is 
generally borne by the service provider 
If a participants joins or leaves the CCA, shares 
should be adjusted in accordance with the ALP 
 Terminating or extending the service agreement 
to other participants has generally no implication 
on other service recipients 
Written agreements and appropriate 
documentation is important 
Formal contracts not always available. The 
agreement is usually limited to the direct 
relationship between the provider and the 
recipient 
All participants are contributing to a common 
activity and shared costs reflect expected 
benefits 
The provider charge a cost plus price, requiring an 
element of profit for providing the service 
Allocation of costs are based on expected 
benefits 
The allocation key is based on the extent each 
company has requested the service 
(EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, 2012) 
